STRATEGIC AUTONOMY FOR TURKEY AND THE EU
There are several attempts to define the expression “strategic autonomy”. In its “negative” interpretation, it refers to the ability to defend against outside pressure and interference successfully. In its positive interpretation, it means that a country or union of countries is able to pursue its main goals and projects. Of course, there are always conditions and influences that must be taken into account. Strategic autonomy is always relative and limited, but it still gives more power than the constraints that exist for countries under the influence of an empire or in exclusive alliances. In today’s world, the successful implementation of strategic autonomy needs a sound and balanced economic basis and efficient military capabilities, which, by the way, applies to both Turkey and the European Union.
The economic basis
Turkey remains integrated within the European economy, but has reoriented and strengthened its trade relations with countries such as Russia, as well as several Asian and African nations. Nevertheless, the European Union continues to be Turkey’s primary trading partner and its main source of capital flows and investments. What is particularly prominent is the much more favorable trade balance between the EU and Turkey compared to the BRICS countries. Developing trade relations with some BRICS countries, especially Russia, comes with a growing trade deficit.
Meryem Götken and Richard Grieveson underline in their WIIW Policy Note 90, under the title “Turkey’s geo-economic shift” (2024), that “Turkey is increasingly being forced by the West in general and the US in particular to abandon its middle way between the West and Russia. Turkey was probably never as important in Russian sanctions avoidance as some supposed, but clearly it has been part of the reason that the Russian economy has held up so much better than expected since the imposition of Western sanctions following the 2022 invasion...In a world of ever-increasing geo-economic tensions and bloc-building, it is in the EU's interests that it, rather than China or Russia, remains the main economic partner.” In this connection, they argue, and I fully agree, for a more proactive stance towards Turkey and, specifically, for a modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union.
Nevertheless, we must accept that Turkey will still try to remain within its specific concept of strategic autonomy. And as Marc Perini underlines in “Turkey's Geopolitical Role. Between National Ambitions, Western Anchors and Russian Sway” (2023), “The current ‘balanced policy’ between NATO and Russia will clearly remain a pillar of Turkey’s foreign policy”. But not all pillars have the same strength and capacity to support the construction of Turkish strategic autonomy. In the future, the European Union should try to be a stronger pillar of Turkish foreign policy than it has been in the past.
A strong military
It is obvious, yet often neglected, that a viable strategic autonomy, which should empower a country to play a strong regional and global role, requires a strong military background. This is especially true in crisis-ridden regions. According to various sources, Turkey has approximately 900,000 military personnel, with over 350,000 serving on active duty. It has the second-largest army within NATO, and its military is today recognized as one of the most technologically advanced in the world. The country has also developed a powerful defense industry sector with increasing arms exports.
As a recent article in “The Economist” (September 6th, 2025) reports: “Over the past five years, its arms exports have shot up, from nearly $2bn to over $7bn last year. This is a result of efforts to achieve strategic autonomy…Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, likes the diplomatic influence that comes with arms sales to Africa and the Middle East. But Turkish firms are looking to European countries with their big budgets.” There are also clear advantages for weapons coming from Turkey: “Turkish weapons are ‘battle-proven through its conflict with the Kurds and its interventions in Syria and Libya. They are built to NATO standards and affordable, and have a no-strings-attached sales policy.”
Senem Aydin-Düzgit, Mustafa Kutlay, and E.Fiat Keyman conclude in their article “ Strategic autonomy in Turkish foreign policy in an age of multipolarity: linages and contradictions of an idea”(2025): “The recent strides made in the indigenous defense industry have become a noticeable area that underpins Turkey’s quest for strategic autonomy. As geopolitical rifts with the USA intensified, multiple political conflicts deteriorated the regional security environment, and defense-related sanctions became a more frequently used tool by Western powers, Turkish governments prioritized building indigenous technologies in the defense industries…..The noticeable advancements in the defense industry gave Turkish policy makers an important edge in Turkey’s external relations.”
Europe should use this edge to have a constructive strategic dialogue with Turkey, especially concerning the Black Sea region. Generally, as Mustafa Kutlay argues in “Turkey’s Middle-Power Dilemma” in “Foreign Affairs”( 2025), Brussels should “treat Turkey as a true security partner, not just as a buffer state that prevents large numbers of refugees from entering Europe.”
An alignment of necessity?
Several experts on Turkey published recently an SWP comment under the title “Alignment of Necessity - Turkey’s Role in the Future European Security Architecture” (2025): “Europe faces the dual challenge of ensuring the long-term security of Ukraine, the Baltic states, and the Black Sea region and strengthening the European Union’s defense and military capabilities. Turkey has a strategically significant, albeit politically contentious role to play within both contexts.”
After describing how several EU members have recently strengthened their defense cooperation with Turkey, the experts conclude: “Turkey and the EU stand at the crossroads of necessity amid the ongoing reframing of Europe’s defense and security future.” In particular, they ask for the lifting of all official and unofficial arms embargoes, on the condition that these arms are not used against any EU member country, especially Greece and Cyprus. They also ask that co-produced weapons are only used in accordance with EU interests and norms, and that the European Council “should reassure the European Parliament that defense and security cooperation with Turkey will be treated as a separate issue from the country’s accession process.”
Especially for the Black Sea region, Turkey plays a vital role for Europe. As Stefan Meister writes in Policy Brief No. 1, published on iipvienna.com (2025), the EU should closely cooperate with Turkey in the interest of protecting the strategic infrastructure in the Black Sea, such as ports, pipelines, and submarine cables. “As Turkey is a key country for the EU’s Black Sea policy, more engagement is needed to bring Ankara on board…. As the Turkish government needs Western support to stabilize its economy, the EU might also link economic cooperation with Turkey to collaboration in the Black Sea. The EU’s support for Turkey’s economic and financial stabilization, updating the customs Union, and progressing towards a visa-free regime are potential entry points despite the authoritarian trends in domestic policy.”
In addition, there is also a lot of potential in stabilizing the situation in the Middle East. Turkey does play an important role in Syria, but cannot handle the reconstruction and reconciliation on its own. It could play an essential role in stopping the hubris of the present Israeli government, which is going rogue, and may have a softening influence in Tehran by convincing the country to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons and from destabilizing some of its neighboring countries. Turkey could contribute enormously to stability in the South Caucasus. Of course, Turkey will not play to serve European interests. However, the European Union should look for common interests and areas of mutual support.
In the framework of such a strategic partnership, the long-standing conflicts concerning the sea border with Greece and the Cyprus issues could also be brought closer to a solution. Moreover, comprehensive cooperation among all countries of the Eastern Mediterranean regarding energy would be a significant step towards peace and stability in the Middle East. In the past, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus were not very helpful in reaching an understanding with Turkey, and Turkey itself was often not interested in contributing to the solution of the open questions and issues. However, within the framework of a comprehensive new start of the relationship, based on mutual interests, realism, and pragmatism, even these critical issues could be solved.
But one of the most dangerous developments could arise out of the competition between Israel and Turkey for leadership and dominance in the Middle East. In this respect, Asli Aydintasbas calls on the EU to engage actively in building bridges between Turkey and Israel, especially when they deal with the Iran nuclear issue. An essay published by ECFR under the title “Axis of unease: Why the Europeans should try to manage a Turkey-Israel rivalry” (2025) writes, “As Europe and the US consider how to approach a new round of nuclear diplomacy, they should also recognize Ankara’s unease and the existence of Turkey’s rivalry with Israel. They need to help chart a stable course between the two in Syria, Gaza, and elsewhere - one which brings Turkey back into Europe’s defensive priorities and prevents a collision course between the two regional heavyweights.”
Both Turkey and the EU seek to design and implement a policy of strategic autonomy. Both have many hurdles to overcome and still regard the US as an important actor to respect and to rely on. They also must accept NATO as the leading security provider, showing that strategic autonomy has its limitations. Nevertheless, both could develop a pragmatic strategic partnership that would strengthen their abilities as decisive players, at least regionally, that is. With Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, and especially the concerns about the effects and consequences for the Black Sea region, such cooperation is undoubtedly necessary.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.