A CONTESTED EU CANDIDATE
The relationship between European countries and Turkey has always been complicated. For many centuries, Turkey was definitely seen as a European country, and towards the end of the nineteenth century, it was called the “sick man of Europe“. However, as the relationship between Turkey and the European Union evolved further after World War II, the question arose of whether Turkey was a European country, and the issue of where the Eastern border of Europe should be drawn became a subject of intense discussion.
Democracy and human rights issues dominated
Anyway, the path Turkey had to take to become an EU candidate and to open accession negotiations was very bumpy, and it has remained so in its attempts to build better relations with the EU. European countries have always been split about the usefulness and urgency of having Turkey as an EU member. For many years, I could observe and follow Turkey‘s complicated relationship, its hopes, disappointments, and anger. I was not one year in the European Parliament, and I was already appointed rapporteur for Turkey for the first time. I was a staunch supporter of opening the EU door for Turkey, but I was also a vehement critic of Turkey’s democratic deficiencies.
Both views have always been clearly expressed in the reports I had to prepare for the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Plenary of the EU Parliament. The discussions of the different parts of the proposed report have always been very controversial. Generally, the colleagues from Cyprus and Greece, but also my Austrian colleagues, had a rather outright negative attitude. As for the European Council, the opinions inside the European Parliament were split. Opponents of a possible EU membership especially highlighted the fact that Turkey was a Muslim country and had a very fragile democratic system with many human rights violations. Although issues of human rights and democracy dominated the reports and debates, I was able to include at least one passage in my first report stating that Turkish membership “could be an important contribution to peace and security in Europe.”
Nevertheless, the domestic issues were, in all Turkey reports, much more prominent than the considerations concerning security in wider Europe. Of course, one could argue that the Kurdish issue, which was always widely dealt with, was and is also a security issue. But it was mainly dealt with from a human rights point of view. We were particularly engaged in defending the rights of the Kurdish politician Leyla Zana, who was voted into the Turkish Parliament. Because she spoke some words in the Kurdish language, she was not only stripped of her membership but was also immediately imprisoned, like many other Kurdish elected politicians after her.
Nationalism against diversity
The Kurdish issue was an important one, as we in the European Parliament supported the concept of a multicultural and diverse society in Turkey. Although many Kurds also participated in the killing and expulsion of Armenians at the end of World War I, the respect for the strong Kurdish minority and its cultural rights should show that Turkey has “overcome” and left behind the genocidal behavior and thinking which characterized the end of the Ottoman Empire. As parliamentarians, we met and supported many Kurdish activists and visited prisons to listen to the complaints of different political prisoners. But in the end, we could not enforce a thorough and sustainable progress towards democracy and respect for human rights.
The hope we had in this respect, when Recep Tayyip Erdogan became prime minister, was soon dashed. Opposition politicians always told us that Erdogan would have a hidden agenda underneath his democratic declarations, and that was probably true. Seeing how he changed from being a supporter of democracy to an authoritarian President, we can now understand the warning of the opposition. But unfortunately, also the republican opposition, CHP had no convincing agenda of combining its secular agenda with democratic reforms and an open policy for the integration of the Kurdish political movements. They were sticking strictly to the ideology of the founder of the republic and the first president, Atatürk. And they relied on the army and its interventionism to save the secular democracy.
What became clear to me in many discussions I had with Turkish politicians - particularly with prime ministers Bülent Ecevit and Mesut Yilmaz, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan - was the strong national pride and nationalism they all expressed. I had to realize that Turkey under no circumstances would be ready to integrate into a community where majority decisions are taken and member countries are asked to implement them in their policies. Yes, Europe with Turkey as a full and active member would be principally stronger, but Turkey would never play that role. To ask Turkey to accept the existing accession criteria was already seen by many as an unjustified interference in domestic affairs.
From nationalism to strategic autonomy
While Erdogan did not invent strong Turkish nationalism, he did invent or at least develop the specific Turkish concept of “strategic autonomy”. And he used that foreign policy concept and strategy to strengthen his authoritarian way of governing the country and its citizens. In this respect, Mustafa Kutlay and Zika Önis underline in their article “Turkish foreign policy and post-western order: strategic autonomy or new forms of dependence?” (2021) that the weakening of the American leadership, the more assertive Russian and Chinese policies and the “discriminatory attitude” of the West towards Turkey had led the country to follow a policy of strategic autonomy. Furthermore, they argue “that the emphasis on strategic autonomy cannot be explained without considering the authoritarian turn in domestic politics - the employment of a ‘strategic autonomy discourse’ as a legitimizing tool at home.” Turkey is a typical example where the promotion and implementation of strategic autonomy is closely connected with the implementation of authoritarian rule.
By remaining an engaged member of NATO, improving relations with Russia and China, reaching out to the countries of the “global south”, joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and applying for membership in BRICS, Turkey has secured a wide scope for maneuver. As Mustafa Kutlay and Zika Önis conclude, “Neither the Western powers nor Russia wants Turkey to move completely to the other side. This creates policy space for a significant mid-range power like Turkey to act independently, without facing penalties it would have faced under the bipolar international systems of the Cold War.”
That does not mean that the strategic autonomy path was and is not connected with hurdles and conflicts. That was particularly true when Turkey supported the Islamic groups during the Arab Spring, and it was isolated after these revolutions failed. Turkey had to accept criticism for its military interventions in Syria for many years, but in the end, it helped to overthrow the Syrian dictator. Today, the tensions with Israel are increasing, and the competition for leadership in the Middle East could also lead to a military collision between the two countries.
Kurds instead of CHP
For the moment, Erdogan is trying, with some visible success, to reduce the domestic tensions with Kurdish political representatives, although many Kurdish politicians are still in prison. He would like to have them as partners in destroying the CHP opposition with its very popular Istanbul mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, whom he also put into prison. Imamoglu would be the most prominent competitor if he could run as a presidential candidate in the next elections. Therefore, Erdogan wants to get rid of him as a possible competitor.
Sinem Adar writes in “Can Turkey Make Multicultural Authoritarianism work?”(published in Foreign Policy (2025): “The government now appears to be pursuing a dual strategy: repressing the CHP while cautiously reintegrating Kurdish political actors. This controlled inclusion of the DEM Party and the PKK aims to reshape the political landscape, marginalize competitors, and reestablish hegemonic dominance….The current peace process represents a high-risk gamble to remake Turkey. If successful, it would consolidate Islamist and nationalist elites, both Turkish and Kurdish, under the banner of Turkish supremacy and a carefully managed pluralism.” Unfortunately, this approach may function for a few years, serving as yet another step toward safeguarding the power and influence of Erdoğan and his circle. Democracy, once again, would be forced to wait.
The recent development of accepting the Kurds as partners inside a democratic political system was, for a long time, one of the most urgent demands for improving the relationship between the European Union and Turkey. As Turkey is still regarded as a candidate and potential future member, the fragile reconciliation process with the Kurds must be viewed very positively. However, the suppression of the republican opposition stands in absolute contradiction to the democratic principles enshrined in the Copenhagen criteria for joining the European Union. Erdogan’s policies are not compatible with his stated intention to join the European Union. To make matters clear, this process must end and be replaced with one that is more productive and viable.
From EU candidate to strategic partnership
Unfortunately, it is not feasible to agree on a new start in the EU-Turkey relations. Turkey would interpret an official termination of its candidate status and the related negotiations as further proof of Europe’s open discrimination against a Muslim country. Therefore, Europe will continue to maintain the illusion of Turkey’s possible future membership, while at the same time criticizing the failure to meet the criteria required to keep negotiations alive. Hopefully, this ongoing criticism can at least provide some moral support to domestic critics of Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule.
Independent of the formal accession status, the European Union should, de facto, make a clear turn in its relations with Turkey and regard Turkey as an important, even if still complicated, security partner. As the most recent report of the European Parliament notes about the Commission report, in the peculiar wording of such reports, there is “a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union and Türkiye,” and it observes “an increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process.”
Europe has generally refrained from building alliances on the basis of common values and moral principles. Its institutions are often unable to apply the same principles they expect, sometimes unsuccessfully, to their own member states. As more and more countries adopt this transactional approach in international relations, Europe must adapt to this pattern of foreign policy. This, however, does not mean to accept any kind of international behavior. Europe must uphold respect for national sovereignty and decision-making, while at the same time promoting multilateralism and multinationalism as ways to solve critical issues. It is essential to find a new and more adequate relationship with Turkey, as part of the more pragmatic foreign relations policy Europe has to develop.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.