THE CASE OF AUSTRIA
Like all subjects of the public domain, National and European Defense policies cannot hope to have unanimous support. And often we find ourselves not only diverse but also full of contradicting attitudes within the same community. This is specifically the case in Austria, with its special role of Austrian neutrality. In general, there is a gap between the efforts and commitments of national governments and the European Union/NATO on one side, and public opinion on the other. In countries closer to the conflict of Russian aggression, this gap appears to be smaller or even non-existent. In the Nordic and Baltic states, as well as Poland, there is a very high concern for strict security, even though in some of these countries, economic and climate issues remain major public concerns (Eurobarometer 2025). Poland's high level of defence spending, along with the shift in Sweden and Finland from de facto neutrality to NATO membership, demonstrates the strong defence commitment of these countries and their public support. This stands in clear contrast to the public opinion and perception of security in Austria.
Neutrality and defence
Neutrality was declared by the Austrian Parliament on October 26, 1955, immediately after the departure of the occupying Allied troops. But of course, it had already been informally agreed upon during the negotiations for the Austrian State Treaty, which had been signed in May of that same year by the foreign ministers of the four Allies and the Austrian foreign minister. It was a product of the Cold War era and intended to contribute to maintaining the balance between East and West.
The decision to remain “permanently neutral” also met strong support from Austrian citizens after their experience in the years after World War I. In these years, the country could not get out of an economic crisis and finally hoped that Mussolini and Hitler would bring economic progress, peace, and stability. Instead, they brought war, and Austrians played a disastrous and shameful role within the Nazi terror regime. After the collapse of Nazi Germany, of which Austria had been a part, many Austrians developed sentiments that persist today: a desire to be left alone and to avoid interfering in the affairs of other countries. Still, Austrians later voted with a two-thirds majority to join the European Union, partly as a contribution to its security in a broader sense. Nevertheless, this did not affect their rather isolationist attitude, primarily expressed by the Euro-skeptic right wing, represented by the strongest party in the Parliament, the SPÖ.
Austrian public opinion
In a public opinion survey organized by Gallup in 2024, 74% of the respondents said „neutrality should be preserved“, while only 14% expressed their support for joining NATO. Accordingly, citizens are quite restrictive concerning Austrian international engagements. Only 39% favored unarmed peace missions, and only 38% supported taking clear positions in conflicts. Furthermore, 20% of the respondents supported participation in armed peace missions, while at the same time, 42% of the respondents agreed that Austria is not at all able to defend itself against a military attack. But in the end, an equal number of those interviewed ultimately emphasized the necessity to increase national defence
A comprehensive survey carried out for the Austrian defence ministry comes to similar conclusions. The issues Austrians consider most pressing are rising prices, immigration, climate change, and fake news. 45% of Austrians plead for keeping the nation out of conflicts, an increase since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Austrians expressed stronger support for diplomatic negotiations, disarmament efforts, and international aid. In line with this, respondents largely opposed participation in armed peace missions. Notably, more people favored deploying the military to defend the country against illegal migrants than to assist refugees in finding a place in Austria.
Further results indicate that 55% of respondents support non-intervention, while 47% are in favor of Austria taking care of its own security. Only 38% of the interviewees support Austria's participation in the Sky Shield Initiative. A somewhat more favorable view was brought up, regarding the creation of a Common European Army operating alongside national armies, with support also for closer cooperation between Austria’s armed forces and other European militaries. Yet, only 31% of respondents said they would be prepared to defend Austria in the event of an attack, while 58% said they would not.
For most citizens, the Austrian army is connected with missions such as responding to natural disasters, defending against illegal migration, and preventing terrorism and cyberattacks. When it comes to defense policy in its strict sense, however, there is little public interest, especially among women.
Austrians, the EU, and Russia
Concerning the specific case of Russia, 64 % of respondents support the policy of becoming independent of Russian gas. However, only 39% of Austrians view the Russian aggression against Ukraine as a threat to Austrian security. A small number - especially on the right political spectrum - even expresses understanding for Russia’s behavior and considers Russia a reliable partner for Austria.
Austrians have continuously supported the “permanent neutrality” established in 1955, which prohibits the stationing of foreign troops in the country and forbids membership in foreign military alliances, particularly NATO. There is some support, however, for a European army that would cooperate with different national armies.
The Russian war against Ukraine has further strengthened the tendency to abstain from intervening in foreign conflicts. Even armed peace missions are seen critically. People realize that Austria would not be able to defend itself against any aggression, but they hope the country will not be attacked or that others (such as NATO or the EU) will come to help them. It is not clear on what basis this hope is relying.
All this is also confirmed by a poll organised in the framework of the Austrian Foreign Policy Panel Project spanning from 2023 to 2025. A majority of respondents view neutrality as an integral part of Austrian identity. It doesn't help much in avoiding attacks against Austria, but it gives Austria the opportunity to be actively engaged in preventing conflicts and peacekeeping in Europe. It also strengthens the role of Austria in international organizations!
This, of course, was also the policy implemented in the 1960s and 1970s, when a climate of détente and disarmament negotiations existed. The majority of Austrian citizens also saw the present situation as not very different from the one in the years before February 2022. For them, the Russian attack on Ukraine has not fundamentally changed the political order of Europe, or at least the way Austria should react to tensions and conflicts on European soil.
Mediation is Austria’s role.
In concluding what the public expressed about neutrality and defence, it seems that diplomatic initiatives and negotiations are seen as the way to solve conflicts. Austria could and should hope that such negotiations take place. The view that conflicts can be resolved in a way similar to how Austria achieved its independence after World War II is widespread. Conflicting parties should just sit at a table, talk, and find a compromise, and everything will be solved. The new realities of today’s Russia and also today’s U.S. are not part of foreign and security thinking for a majority of Austrians. It is a striking parallel to Trump's approach of making a deal by meeting with Putin. One should recognize that so far this attempt of deal-making has failed. And with the rise of imperial thinking and action, this view on how to solve conflicts seems naive.
Eurobarometer Spring 2025
The public attitude expressed in Austrian opinion polls is confirmed by the findings of the Eurobarometer of spring 2025. Austrians think that the most important issue facing the EU is the “international situation”. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is mentioned by 19% against 27% of the European average. Security is seen as a less critical issue (14% against 20%). On the other hand, the economic situation and migration are seen by Austrians as slightly more important issues for Europe than by the average EU citizen.
For Austria itself, inflation is the number one concern, as it is for the average of all EU countries! The economic situation and government debt are perceived as much more critical by the average EU citizen than they are in their respective countries. Immigration is ranked higher, and security and defense are ranked lower than the European average. For Europe and for Austria itself, Austrians see economic issues - but also environmental issues - as more critical and urgent issues than security and defence.
Austrian Security Strategy
This ambivalence in the public attitude towards defence can also be found in the official Austrian Security Strategy 2024 published by the Austrian Chancellery. Its ambivalence, and some may say contradictions, stem from its EU membership as a neutral country. This was easy to deal with when defence issues did not play an important role in defining the European foreign and security policies. But with the Russian aggression against Ukraine and acts of cyber war against EU countries, things have changed. And to be fair, the security strategy and the day-to-day policy of Austria are not only aware of the changed security situation in Europe but are also supporting the relevant EU policies. This was also clearly expressed by the Austrian Chancellor after the violations of European airspace by drones and fighter jets. Austria does not support the line of Viktor Orban and other “friends” of Putin.
In this respect, the Security Strategy mentions the main challenges as “the return of war and conventional military conflict as a means of power, the increase in hybrid threats, and the increasing questioning of European values and the European way of life.” It specifically mentions Russia, but also other actors: “It can be assumed that these actors will increasingly attempt to destabilize European democracies and negatively influence the European integration process.”
The strategy adds: “Austria’s national interests and goals are closely connected with those of our European partners. We are not only connected historically and geographically, but also via the European Treaties.” In this respect, Austria promises to “actively and in solidarity contribute to the CFSP/CSDP and thereby strengthen both Austria’s and the EU’s security.”
The increased importance of a strong military due to the Russian aggression is also underlined: “Traditional military tasks of defence and countermeasures have significantly gained importance in all European armed forces, as in Austria.” The strategy acknowledges that European defence cooperation needs to be strengthened. And it makes clear that the “EU’s security is the foundation for the security of Austria, therefore, the EU provides our primary security framework.” Consequently, Austria “will contribute to the EU’s role as a stabilizing and influential actor in the area of security and defence and implement the measures of the Strategic Compass together with EU partners.”
The Austrian Security Strategy is clearly based on European Security interests as its foundation for the Austrian security strategy and policy. It sees both securities as closely linked and not to be separated. The only restriction on fully participating in defence and military actions is the constitutionally embedded principle of military neutrality. The Austrian policy towards and inside the European Union exploits all possibilities this constitutional restriction - and the strong support for it in the populations - allows. It is a tightrope walk the Austrian government has to undertake.
It is evident that the right-wing nationalist opposition strongly opposes this policy. It tried to change the course of the government’s Security Strategy and its implementation in the course of the (failed) negotiations to form a coalition government with the Austrian People's Party. This is another instance of agreement with the Russian position. The anti-European position of the right-wing was the biggest obstacle to forming a government under the leadership of the FPÖ chairman.
Looking beyond the military side
The Austrian example shows, perhaps more than the public opinions in other European countries, that the European defence policy and strategy stand on fragile ground. In many countries, you find strong elements of public opinion that are critical towards defending Europe against cyber attacks, primarily coming from Russia. Changes in government in some countries can have a dramatic influence on European defence efforts, and, of course, changes in Austria are less significant than those in countries like France and Germany.
Furthermore, not all nationalist right-wing parties are against more substantial defence expenditures. Nevertheless, the public opinion mustn’t be neglected. A sincere and open dialogue by both national and European political leaders is essential to engage citizens on where they perceive the greatest threats to European security, its way of life, and its values. Only then can we successfully argue for strengthening national and European defence. One cannot take for granted that an increase in military expenditures will be widely accepted. For many people, the simple slogan “peace instead of war” is convincing - as if defence means the wish to enter into war. The contrary is true, but this must be explained and communicated clearly.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.