It is obviously too early to evaluate seriously the effects of the present Iran war on Europe. It will definitely have different effects, and it is to be feared that these will be predominantly negative – at least in the short run. The question is if a new alliance between the Gulf countries – possibly including Türkiye – and the European Union can grow out of the ashes of this war. One only can hope that this dreadful war will also offer new chances.
Energy and the Economy
Europe transformed in the past years, especially since the Russian war against Ukraine its energy system and especially its import structure changed decisively. It reduced, with some exceptions – Hungary and Slovakia – strongly its dependence from Russian gas and oil imports, built up its storage capacity and strengthened its reliance on US imports – but not in the same scale as its dependence on Russian imports in the past. Parallel to the diversification, Europe raised its production of energy out of sustainable resources. Nevertheless, the war in Iran and especially the Iranian blockade of the street of Hormuz is an enormous threat for a continuous energy supply, as demand for energy is expected to grow with the duration of the war.
This will lead – and does already – to higher energy prices that will trigger inflation. It will consequently also reduce economic growth in times when Europe was just expecting some minor growth. This and specific public measures to limit or compensate the rise of energy prices will reduce the budgetary room of maneuver in times of austerity.
One critical question is how the European Union would be changing the core of its energy strategy. The recent announcement of the Commission President to subsidy nuclear energy is a dangerous miscalculation. Yes, nuclear energy will remain part of European energy, but it remains incredibly expensive and there are no sustainable solutions to the treatment and storage of nuclear waste. However, the EU’s main effort should focus on expanding renewable energy production from solar and wind, combined with intensified research into energy storage technologies, particularly environmentally sustainable batteries. Nevertheless, for many years to come gas will be an important source of energy production and to have reliable gas exporters as partners remains important–as much as diversification.
Political Consequences
The economic deteriorations discussed will bear political repercussions. Already within the past years, rising rates in inflation were seen by the European public as destabilizing element. This triggered strong criticism of European, energy-importing national governments, who were accused to neglect the inflation issue, which in many cases contributed to an increased support for nationalist parties. It must be feared that war-induced inflation will strengthen nationalistic and anti-European forces, especially in the event of a prolonged conflict.
Another issue is the question of refugees trying to cross the borders to the European Union because of the war and the destruction in Iran and Lebanon. Currently, the EU is trying to implement its recently adopted, more restrictive asylum policies. The big majority of member countries will not be ready to open their border for new refugees. However, limiting irregular migration will remain difficult, even with new agreements with neighboring countries, which may further strengthen support for right-wing political forces.
But besides the migration and asylum issues, the war in the Middle East could also increase conflicts between ethnic and national groups inside the EU. The societal disruption which already happened along the war in Gaza could now also seed new conflicts between those who support Israel and those who interpret this war as another demonstration of Israel’s expansionism and colonialism. In addition, new terrorist attacks against Jewish institutions could also target Europe.
The Iran War will also have some consequences for Russia’s war against Ukraine and the European efforts in support for Ukraine. It will divert attention from the Russian aggression against Ukraine. It will increase Russian income from selling more oil on the international markets for a higher price. It will also strain U.S. weapons stockpiles and may disrupt the peace talks or at least weaken Ukraine’s position in these talks – due to the afore mentioned changes. There may be some limited “positive” effects of the war due to weakened cooperation between Iran and Russia. But this effect may be negligible. At the same time, the events demonstrated once more – after Venezuela – that Russia cannot be considered a reliable security partner, especially when most of its army is still deployed in Ukraine.
But also the relations between the European Union, its member states, and the United States will be affected. This relationship is already strained because of the erratic trade policies of Donald Trump and his Greenland policy. Also, Trump’s doubts about NATO or rather the doubt of Europeans about Trumps commitment to common defense created a general insecurity in European countries. Recently Trump uttered new threats against countries who would not help to counter the blockade of the street of Hormuz. The joint attack by Israel and the U.S. – conducted without any consultation with European partners – reflects two diverging Western worlds.
A New Middle East – With the EU as Partner?
The central open question is what the Middle East region will look like after the war – if the war ends at all. Rather than concluding, the conflict may instead evolve into a cold peace or a more diffuse form of confrontation, characterized by external intervention and recurring drone- and cyber-attacks. All this would create an atmosphere of insecurity for the longer term. For the moment it seems that the purpose of the war – or rather the varying and often vaguely defined objectives by US authorities and Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu – have failed to be achieved. Anyway, the worst outcome would be the continuation of a totalitarian regime in Teheran. It would be a regime with permanent revanchist aspirations against its own citizens and its neighbors, especially those who are allies of the United States. And such a regime in Tehran could be coupled with a civil war between different ethnic and political groups.
This insecurity on Iran’s future could lead to stronger unity and cooperation of the Gulf countries, which would have to overcome their differences and disputes. At the current state of affairs, they are not able and willing to distance themselves from their common security provider, the United States. But the fact that recently the U.S. – by staging the war against Iran – were rather a provider of insecurity may lead to a stronger partnership with the European Union. This will be predominantly an economic cooperation but would include also security and defense cooperation.
Some countries like France developed such closer cooperation already some years ago, opening a starting point for strategic cooperation between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Türkiye could – and should – also be part of such a cooperation. Yet, that depends on the readiness of Türkiye to participate in such a multilateral framework and on the EU’s readiness – again especially by France (as well as Greece and Cyprus) to accept Türkiye as partner.
For Türkiye also the Kurdish issue is of great relevance. If the U.S. and Israel would be successful in activating Kurdish groups to fight against the Iranian leadership, this may be seen as an incentive by Kurds in Türkiye to resume fights for independence or at least autonomy. Similar dynamics could emerge in Syria, where the provisional government under Ahmed al-Sharaa initially advocated federalization but has since moved to centralize power, particularly in the military sphere. This includes efforts to integrate or disarm Kurdish forces, consider unacceptable by the Kurds and has led to skirmishes between the ‘New Syrian Army’ and the SDF. As a consequence, this could bring Türkiye to the conviction that a common policy against changing borders and for regional cooperation would be useful and even necessary.
Anyway, a new regional cooperation could also develop a policy of integrating the Kurds into their specific countries, mainly Türkiye, Iraq, Syria, and Iran with a productive cultural cross-border cooperation. It may relate to formal regional autonomy like in Iraq or without such a constitutional solution. Instead of fighting against the individual governments for achieving a separate Kurdish state they should be engaged in building bridges between the Kurdish groups in the different countries. A constructive attitude of the countries concerned and of the different Kurdish groups could be a stabilizing factor for the region.
Additionally, it would be wise and helpful to extend cooperation to the countries of South Caucasus, especially Armenia and Azerbaijan. They have different relationships with Iran, and Israel, and the Gulf countries. A commitment of these two countries – and Georgi – could contribute also to a sustained and comprehensive peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And of course, the other countries of the region, especially Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq could and should be included and involved in developing a new secure Middle East. And to include India would also give new impetus to the recent economic agreement between the EU and India.
If closer cooperation as to happen inside the immediate and wider region, Israel would have to decide if It would prefer to engage again and again in wars against Iran and Lebanon and would always like to depend on the U.S. for the these wars.[1] The alternative would be to finally start developing a successful Palestinian policy by offering them a decent life and negotiations about some institutional framework. In this case, Israel could also rely on its neighbors – including Europe – to form an alliance against any regional aggressor like todays Iran.
Of course this would never exclude American engagement in the region. Maybe a future U.S president would be happy to be not always the only ‘strongman’ responsible for order in the Middle East region – or, as recent events have shown, for the chaos that often comes with it.
Anyway, the Middle East is a region which in the past was not able – or rather interested – in finding stability which could lead from war and conflict to cooperation and peace. With all the present setbacks this is what happened in Europe after World War II: a strong effort to build bridges and new unheard forms of cooperation. Of course, the Middle East is characterized by a greater diversity of ethnic and religious societies. The specific history of the Jews in the region, the resurgence of Jewish immigration after World War II, and the dominant Arab reaction are specificities which cannot be easily disregarded. And the same is true for the strong external influences, especially by the United States.
But all these specific circumstances do not make it impossible to overcome the animosities and conflicts that limited the potential of the countries of the region. Iran’s aggressive policies, Israel’s reluctance to recognize the basic rights of Palestinians, the Palestinians’ weak leadership, the aggressive leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah, and the unwillingness of many Arab states to take a leadership role for establishing a New Middle East could be overcome if inside the region the younger generation would stop following the disastrous policies of their ancestors. To do so, they would have to have the courage to start new paths. And Europe could help in finding this path. It would have to be an effective turnaround. This turn around would most probably not lead to a Middle East Union similar to the institutional framework of the European Union. But it could lead to security-cooperation like the OSCE.
All that may be regarded today as an illusion and mere phantasy. When developing a policy along this outline one has of course to have in mind all the difficulties and obstacles. It would also need a lot of efforts to overcome the many obstacles put on the road repeatedly by those who think they may lose on influence and power. One has also to add, that such cooperation across the regional boundaries would and should not be framed as a confrontational policy directed against any party – but one of finding ways to work together. Russia, China, and India, but also other countries have their special interests and relations. It could also be in their interest if the region is characterized by stability and not by permanent conflict and war.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IIP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 and then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.