Introduction
The year 2025 represents an important turning point for the South Caucasus, a region where peace has historically carried different meanings for different actors. Located at the intersection of Europe and Asia, where multiple regional powers maintain strategic interests, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan have each undergone significant developments that merit careful examination. These transformations have implications not only for how we understand stability and security in the region, but also for the broader European neighborhood.
The Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement initialed in August 2025 at the White House represents a potentially historic breakthrough after nearly four decades of conflict. Yet this diplomatic achievement unfolds against a complex backdrop: Georgia navigates tensions between economic prosperity and evolving governance structures, Armenia undertakes a strategic reorientation of historic proportions, and Azerbaijan consolidates territorial gains while positioning itself as a regional connectivity hub.
As we approach 2026, the fundamental question concerns not merely whether active hostilities have ceased, but rather what form peace takes, who shapes its contours, and whether emerging arrangements prove durable or conditional. This analysis examines how each country defines peace in practice, the internal and external tensions these definitions generate, and the broader implications for regional stability and European engagement.
Georgia: Navigating Stability and Transformation
The Year of Sustained Political Dialogue
Georgia's experience in 2025 has been marked by intense political activity and sustained public engagement. The country has seen over 365 consecutive days of demonstrations following the October 2024 parliamentary elections, revealing profound disagreements about the country's direction and future.
The government's decision in late November 2024 to postpone EU accession negotiations until 2028 served as a catalyst for sustained civic mobilization. For a society where polling consistently shows over 80 percent support for European integration, this decision touched fundamental questions about national identity and strategic orientation.
The state's response to demonstrations has raised concerns among international human rights organizations. Amnesty International documented that more than 500 individuals were detained during late 2024 protests, with at least 300 reporting experiences of ill-treatment. A BBC investigation in November 2025 revealed that authorities had employed camite a World War I-era chemical irritant in water cannons, causing prolonged burning sensations and health effects lasting months. OC Media co-founder Mariam Nikuradze documented her own experience with these substances, describing persistent physical effects.
Legislative developments have also attracted international attention. According to Amnesty International's assessment, new regulations require advance notification for demonstrations, with failure to comply carrying detention periods of up to twenty days. Repeated violations can result in felony charges for organizers, potentially carrying multi-year sentences. The wearing of face masks at protests, once a common health precaution, has been redesignated as a criminal offense.
The media environment has experienced significant changes. The independent broadcaster Mtavari Arkhi was forced off air in May 2025. These developments contributed to Georgia's reclassification as an "electoral autocracy" by the V-Dem Institute, which documented what it termed major democratic challenges since 2018, including concerns about electoral processes, external influences, and media pluralism. The 2025 V-Dem Democracy Report noted that 2024 marked the country's most significant single-year decline in democratic indicators since independence.
Nevertheless, civic engagement has remained robust. A Facebook group called Daitove, with approximately 250,000 members, has facilitated coordination of demonstrations and information sharing. Protesters have employed creative approaches, including organizing New Year's celebrations outside parliament and coordinating a three-hour general strike featuring performances by National Ballet dancers.
Economic Performances and Development
Georgia's economic indicators have shown notable strength throughout 2025. GDP grew 7.9 percent year-on-year from January to August, with exports increasing 13.7 percent and state revenues climbing 8 percent. Average nominal salaries rose 10.3 percent by mid-year. This sustained economic performance has provided the government with significant fiscal capacity and has contributed to social stability amid political tensions.
However, this economic success raises questions about long-term sustainability and alignment. CNN reported in July 2025 that Iranian business interests are increasingly utilizing Georgia as a transit point for sanctions circumvention. The country has also deepened economic ties with China, awarding the strategically important Anaklia deep-sea port project to a Chinese consortium in 2024. These developments reflect Georgia's pragmatic approach to economic partnerships, though they may complicate relationships with traditional Western partners.
The relationship with the United States has experienced strain. In December 2024, Washington imposed sanctions on oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of the ruling party Georgian Dream and widely regarded as a highly influential figure in Georgian politics. The bipartisan Megobari Act promises additional measures targeting officials associated with election irregularities, corruption, and restrictions on civil society. US Ambassador Robin Dunnigan has publicly expressed concern about anti-American rhetoric and described communications from Georgian officials as poorly received in Washington.
Geopolitical Context
Georgia's position in the South Caucasus has evolved significantly. While Armenia has pursued closer integration with Europe and Azerbaijan has shown increasing assertiveness in its relations with Moscow following the December 2024 downing of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 by a Russian surface-to-air missile, Georgia has maintained a more complex relationship with Russia.
Throughout 2025, Russia has repeatedly signaled openness to restoring diplomatic relations, severed since the 2008 war, though Moscow insists its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states remains "irreversible." In December 2025, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze reiterated that Georgia will not restore ties unless Russia reverses this recognition. Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, bilateral trade reached nearly $1.3 billion in the first half of 2025, a 7 percent increase from the previous year.
Concrete developments suggest continued Russian consolidation in the occupied territories. In February 2025, the first test flight from Moscow to Sukhumi Airport in Abkhazia took place after 30 years of disuse. Wilson Center analysis characterizes the relationship as a "quasi-partnership based on elite interests," noting that 69 percent of Georgians view Russia as an enemy despite the government's pragmatic economic engagement.
Russia's influence extends through multiple interdependent channels. Energy dependence has grown significantly Georgia has become increasingly reliant on Russian oil products and liquefied petroleum gas controlled by Moscow-backed enterprises, with this dependence increasing since 2021 despite earlier diversification efforts. Most concerning, Georgia lacks a strategic gas reserve despite receiving €120 million from European institutions for its construction; the government redirected these funds during the COVID-19 pandemic, leaving the country vulnerable to supply disruptions.
The Georgian Orthodox Church, which enjoys the trust of the majority of the population, serves as a conduit for traditionalist and anti-Western messaging that often aligns with Russian narratives, though pro-Western factions within the Church provide some counterbalance. Russian popular culture maintains significant presence through satellite television, films, and consumer products, while Russian remains a language of commerce particularly among older generations.
Economic interdependence has deepened considerably. Hundreds of thousands of Georgians work in Russia and send remittances home, creating dependencies Moscow has weaponized in the past most notably during the 2006 deportations of ethnic Georgian workers. Following Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the structure of Russian business activities in Georgia changed significantly, with small and medium-sized enterprises replacing larger Russian firms. Given that 38 percent of foreign investments in Georgia originate from offshore zones, accurately assessing the extent of Russian oligarchic influence remains challenging.
Foreign Policy Research Institute characterizes Russian operations in Georgia as "one of the Black Sea region's most comprehensive hybrid warfare campaigns," employing military intervention, territorial occupation, economic leverage, political co-optation, corruption, and information warfare. The Kremlin's objective is to undermine Georgia's statehood and derail the country from its democratic development and Euro-Atlantic integration path.
Georgia has declined participation in the "3+3 format" (Russia, Iran, and Turkey alongside the three South Caucasus states), though it holds an open invitation.
Outlook for 2026
Several factors will shape Georgia's trajectory in the coming year:
Institutional Dynamics: Following the October 2024 elections, all major opposition parties were effectively banned or excluded from parliament, with opposition forces boycotting parliamentary participation in protest against what they viewed as fraudulent results. Georgian Dream now faces minimal organized resistance within formal political structures. The government has pursued what analysts describe as gradual institutional consolidation, implementing measures incrementally rather than through dramatic reforms. This approach, as noted in a GMF policy brief, has proven effective in managing political transitions while maintaining economic growth.
Economic Considerations: Continued economic performance will remain central to political stability. If growth continues at current rates, the government will maintain significant policy flexibility. However, the sustainability of an economic model increasingly dependent on Russia and China both in terms of trade flows and investment in strategic infrastructure may face scrutiny from Western partners and domestic critics concerned about Georgia's strategic alignment and long-term European aspirations.
Civil Society Resilience: After more than a year of sustained civic engagement, civil society organizations face challenges in maintaining momentum without institutional representation. The October 4, 2025 attempted mobilization, which drew tens of thousands but ended in clashes with police near the presidential palace, may have demonstrated both the limits and the persistence of street-level political action.
International Engagement: The European Union has indicated that Georgia's accession process depends on addressing democratic governance concerns. The effectiveness of international pressure remains uncertain, particularly given the precedent of economic growth amid external criticism.
Regional Dynamics: Developments in Ukraine will significantly affect Georgia's strategic calculations. An end of the war on Russia’s terms could provide Moscow with greater capacity to shape regional dynamics, while continued Russian focus on Ukraine may create space for diverse regional engagements.
For Georgia, peace in 2026 will likely continue to mean the absence of military conflict combined with economic development, though questions remain about the balance between stability and democratic pluralism, and between economic pragmatism and strategic alignment with Europe.
Armenia: Strategic Transformation and Domestic Reckoning
A Historic Pivot
Armenia's experience in 2025 represents perhaps the most dramatic strategic reorientation of any post-Soviet state in recent years. The August 8, 2025 White House ceremony, where Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev initialed a peace framework under US mediation, marked the culmination of Armenia's pivot away from its traditional reliance on Russian security architecture.
This shift was precipitated by Azerbaijan's September 2023 military operation that resulted in Baku regaining control of Nagorno-Karabakh and the departure of more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians from the region. Russian peacekeepers withdrew from Karabakh in mid-2024, significantly earlier than the framework anticipated, exposing what many Armenians perceived as the limitations of Russia’s security umbrella/guarantees. As Chatham House noted, Russia's focus on Ukraine and desire for good relations with Azerbaijan has seen Moscow recede from its traditional dual role as Armenia's security guarantor and mediator between Baku and Yerevan.
Armenia has subsequently frozen participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization since 2024, with Pashinyan publicly characterizing the alliance as incompatible with Armenia's security interests. Armenian border guards assumed control of sections of the border with Iran and Turkey from Russian forces for the first time in over three decades, marking a significant shift in the country's security posture.
European Integration Path
In March 2025, Armenia's parliament adopted legislation to open an EU accession process, signed into law by President Vahagn Khachaturyan on April 4. Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan indicated that Armenia could formally apply for membership within months, representing a fundamental reorientation of the country's external partnerships.
The European Union has deepened its engagement through the European Union Monitoring Mission in Armenia (EUMA), extended until 2027 with a budget exceeding 44 million euros. By April 2025, the mission had completed more than 5,000 patrols along Armenia's border with Azerbaijan, providing a tangible European security presence in what has traditionally been Russia's sphere of influence.
The Peace Framework and TRIPP Corridor
The peace agreement framework addresses fundamental issues including border demarcation and minority rights. Most significantly, it establishes the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) a 43-kilometer corridor through southern Armenia's Syunik region linking mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave. According to CNN reporting, the United States secured development rights to this route for 99 years, with plans for rail lines, oil and gas pipelines, and fiber optic infrastructure.
As International Crisis Group analysis explains, under a long-term leasing arrangement to US private enterprises, TRIPP aims to preserve Armenian sovereignty while providing for unimpeded connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. This represents a compromise between Azerbaijan's longstanding insistence on what it terms the "Zangezur Corridor" (with exemption from Armenian customs and security clearance) and Armenia's "Crossroads of Peace" concept advocating national sovereign control and reciprocity.
Chatham House observed that perceptions of a "Pax Americana" in the fiercely competitive geopolitics of the South Caucasus are likely to induce reactions from those perceived as disadvantaged. Sustained Russian hostility to TRIPP can be expected, possibly including pressure on Azerbaijani energy infrastructure, Armenia's trade within the Eurasian Union, and the communities of both nationalities in Russia. Iran has publicly rejected the planned transit corridor, viewing it as threatening its geopolitical interests.
Domestic Political Landscape
Despite foreign policy achievements, Pashinyan's domestic political position has faced challenges throughout 2025. Polling conducted by MPG/Gallup International from April 29 to May 2 revealed that only 11 to 11.5 percent of respondents would support Civil Contract if elections were held at that time, compared to about 12 percent backing opposition parties aligned with former presidents. Some 28 percent remained undecided or rejected all options.
Local elections provided concerning signals for the government. In March 2025, Civil Contract failed to secure a majority in Gyumri, Armenia's second-largest city, and lost in Parakar village community. As Jamestown Foundation analysis noted, these results highlighted declining government popularity ahead of the crucial June 2026 parliamentary elections.
The government's relationship with the Armenian Apostolic Church has become strained. Given the church's central role in Armenian national identity, perceived hostility toward religious institutions has provoked backlash both domestically and within the influential Armenian diaspora, contributing to societal polarization.
Arrests in mid-2025 of opposition figures and religious leaders on charges of plotting against the government demonstrated rising internal tensions. Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan was imprisoned on such charges, though his nephew appeared on international media to criticize government policies.
Integration of Displaced Persons
International Crisis Group reported in December 2025 that Armenia faces significant challenges integrating over 100,000 refugees who fled Nagorno-Karabakh. "If these tensions remain unaddressed, the displacement from Karabakh will remain an open wound in Armenian politics and society," the report warned, noting that Armenia's difficulty in this regard "risks undermining the country's efforts to unite society behind its push for a lasting peace with Baku."
2026 Outlook: The Decisive Elections
The June 7, 2026 parliamentary elections will determine not merely who governs Armenia but whether the country completes its strategic transformation or reverts to traditional alignments. Several dynamics will shape this critical vote:
The Peace Dividend: Pashinyan has staked his political future on the peace agreement. According to an International Republican Institute poll from June 2025, 47 percent of Armenians support a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, outnumbering the 40 percent who oppose it. If the agreement delivers tangible security and economic benefits before the election—particularly through regional transport connections—Pashinyan may overcome weak approval ratings.
Constitutional Referendum: As International Crisis Group noted, Azerbaijan insists that Armenia revise its constitution to remove language Baku interprets as territorial claims before finalizing the peace treaty. This requires a national referendum, likely held separately from parliamentary elections. The political optics of constitutional changes perceived as concessions present significant electoral risks.
External Influences: Carnegie Europe analyst Thomas de Waal observed that the vote is shaping up as a referendum on Armenia's geopolitical trajectory, with Russia-backed messaging, diaspora influence, and geopolitical bargaining all in play. Moscow retains leverage through Armenia's continued reliance on Russian energy and trade routes. Despite Pashinyan's Western pivot, International Crisis Group reported that 60 percent of poll respondents still want Russia involved in negotiations with Azerbaijan, and support for EU membership declined from 51 percent in January to 37 percent in May 2025.
Opposition Dynamics: While multiple opposition forces have announced participation including movements led by former presidents and newly formed parties they lack unity and coherent policy alternatives. Competition among opposition factions may inadvertently benefit Pashinyan despite weak polling numbers.
Western Support: Pashinyan's survival depends partly on whether Europe and the United States can deliver tangible results before the election. The EU pledged additional financial support during high-level visits to Yerevan in late 2025, though as analysts cautioned, meaningful engagement requires substantial funding and evolution in Armenia's governance approach.
The most likely scenario sees Pashinyan securing a plurality but potentially requiring coalition partners similar to recent local elections. However, a Pashinyan defeat would likely herald Armenia's return to Russian influence, fundamentally altering regional geopolitics. As one analysis concluded, this represents the most unpredictable vote since Armenia's independence in 1991.
For Armenia, peace in 2026 means navigating between competing visions of national identity and security. The election will determine whether Armenia emerges from decades of conflict as a European-oriented state or remains constrained by historical patterns and geographic realities.
Azerbaijan: Consolidation and Regional Connectivity
Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Azerbaijan has approached 2025 as a post-conflict reconstruction phase following complete territorial restoration in 2020 and 2023. The government has framed current developments as the beginning of a new phase focused on rebuilding and regional integration.
Large-scale reconstruction has proceeded in the Karabakh and East Zangezur economic regions. From 2021 to 2024, the state allocated approximately $10.3 billion for reconstruction efforts. The 2025 budget included $2.35 billion for rebuilding, with the 2026 draft budget allocating $3.5 billion. By November 2025, official figures reported nearly 62,000 inhabitants in the liberated territories, including over 5,200 families resettled under the Great Return program.
The August 2025 peace framework with Armenia positioned Azerbaijan to achieve its objective of uninterrupted access to Nakhchivan. As International Crisis Group explained, Azerbaijani policymakers recognize that a peaceful Caucasus, with Armenian participation, is necessary for strengthening connections to Europe. "We want to see Armenia become part of the regional logistics and transport system," a top presidential adviser stated.
Economic Development and Diversification
Azerbaijan's economy grew 4.5 percent in 2024, driven primarily by non-hydrocarbon sectors. Construction expanded 19 percent, transport 17 percent, and hospitality 15 percent. The non-hydrocarbon sector overall expanded 8 percent, significantly outpacing oil sector performance.
However, hydrocarbons remain central to the economy. Oil and gas account for over 90 percent of exports and approximately 60 percent of state revenues. While the government projects this will decrease to 22 percent by 2028, the International Monetary Fund notes the fiscal breakeven oil price has risen from $55 per barrel in 2023 to $73 in 2025, reflecting continued vulnerability to energy price fluctuations.
Azerbaijan's connectivity strategy has gained momentum. Azerbaijan Railways handled 317 block trains via the Middle Corridor in the first ten months of 2025, representing a 32 percent increase compared to the previous year. The Baku International Sea Port completed its first phase expansion, increasing capacity to 15 million tonnes of cargo annually. Natural gas exports expanded beyond European markets in August 2025, Azerbaijan began exporting 1.2 billion cubic meters annually to Syria via Turkey, with potential to scale to 2 billion cubic meters per year.
As International Crisis Group noted, routes from Azerbaijan via Armenia and Turkey have advantages over current routes via Georgia, as they avoid mountain passes that limit rail capacity. They also could be implemented relatively quickly by refurbishing Soviet-era infrastructure.
COP29 Climate Conference
As host of the 29th UN Climate Conference (COP29) in November 2024, Azerbaijan sought to enhance its international profile. The government announced a $500 million climate investment fund and emphasized developing Green Energy Zones in the liberated territories, incorporating renewable energy production and smart energy management.
However, the conference attracted controversy. President Ilham Aliyev's keynote speech defending oil and gas as a "gift from God" and criticizing what he termed "Western fake news" about Azerbaijan's emissions drew sharp criticism from environmental advocates. UN Secretary-General António Guterres, speaking moments later, characterized doubling down on fossil fuels as "absurd."
A Global Witness investigation reported by BBC documented Elnur Soltanov, the COP29 CEO, discussing oil and gas deals with individuals he believed to be potential investors, in apparent violation of UN ethics guidelines. The conference concluded with commitments to mobilize $300 billion annually by 2035 for climate finance significantly below the $1.3 trillion developing countries had sought.
Governance and Civil Society
Azerbaijan's political system remains highly centralized. President Aliyev secured a fifth term in February 2024 elections with limited opposition participation, and his New Azerbaijan Party retained its parliamentary majority in September elections.
The media environment has experienced severe constraints. The Venice Commission criticized Azerbaijan's 2022 media law as over-regulating an already limited space. Amendments in 2025 further tightened controls and expanded fines. The crackdown on independent media intensified dramatically in the months leading up to and following COP29. Human Rights Watch documented that starting in November 2023, authorities targeted at least three independent media platforms Abzas Media, Toplum TV, and Meydan TV arresting their reporters and staff on spurious smuggling charges. In June 2025, seven journalists from Abzas Media were sentenced to prison terms ranging from seven and a half to nine years. By May 2025, at least 25 journalists were behind bars, all facing what press freedom organizations characterized as fabricated charges.
The targeting of critical voices extends beyond journalists to academics and civil society activists. Dr. Gubad Ibadoghlu, a prominent economist and London School of Economics research fellow known for his analysis of corruption in Azerbaijan's oil and gas sector, was arrested in July 2023 on spurious counterfeit currency charges. After 274 days in detention during which his health deteriorated significantly due to heart disease and diabetes, he was moved to house arrest in April 2024. As of late 2025, Dr. Ibadoghlu remains under house arrest, unable to seek adequate medical treatment or travel abroad to take up his university position at TU Dresden. His case drew international attention, with the US State Department, European Parliament, and Amnesty International calling for his release. He was nominated as a finalist for the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought and for the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize.
Reporters Without Borders warned that the information climate risked becoming a "de facto blackout," while international coverage described the environment for independent journalism as severely restricted.
2026 Outlook
Several factors will shape Azerbaijan's trajectory:
Peace Agreement Implementation: The critical question concerns whether the peace framework advances from initialed text to signed, ratified treaty. This depends partly on Armenia's constitutional referendum and partly on Azerbaijan's approach to negotiations. President Aliyev declared 2025 as the Year of Constitution and Sovereignty, suggesting emphasis on consolidating gains.
TRIPP Development: Implementation will test Azerbaijan's ability to balance competing interests American involvement, Turkish support, Iranian opposition, and Russian concerns. The 99-year US lease represents unprecedented American presence in the region. First phase construction is reportedly scheduled for mid-2026.
Economic Diversification: The IMF's April 2025 assessment urged Azerbaijan to attract private investment, reduce state involvement in non-oil sectors, strengthen governance, and improve access to skilled labor and capital. Diversification remains urgent given finite hydrocarbon reserves and global energy transition.
Relations with Russia: Azerbaijan-Russia relations experienced strain throughout 2024-2025, particularly following the December 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines incident. While Russia remains economically important, Baku has shown increasing assertiveness. Whether this trend continues will significantly impact regional dynamics.
Regional Connectivity: Azerbaijan's ambitions as a logistics and transport hub depend on stable neighbor relations, predictable regulatory environment, and ability to compete with alternative routes. International Crisis Group noted that if a deal is signed, "Azerbaijan will no longer be considered an area of ongoing conflict or war or confrontation. And of course, that will be a strong signal to outside economic and other investment players."
For Azerbaijan, peace in 2026 means consolidating territorial gains, maximizing economic benefits from connectivity infrastructure, and maintaining political stability while navigating complex external interests. The challenge involves converting military success into sustainable prosperity within evolving global economic and political contexts.
Regional Dynamics and External Actors
Evolving Great Power Engagement
The most significant development of 2025 has been the reconfiguration of external power engagement in the South Caucasus. Russia's traditional dominance has diminished, though not disappeared. Armenia's pivot toward Western institutions, Azerbaijan's increasingly assertive posture, and Georgia's complex balancing collectively demonstrate Moscow's changed but not eliminated regional role.
The United States emerged as a more active participant through mediation of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace framework and securing TRIPP development rights. This represents the most significant American presence in the region since independence. Turkey has consolidated its position significantly—the opening of connectivity routes through both Georgia and Armenia positions Ankara as a primary gateway between the Caucasus and the West.
The European Union has increased engagement through monitoring missions and financial commitments, though implementation challenges remain. Brussels faces the difficulty of supporting Armenia's European aspirations while managing concerns about Georgia's governance trajectory, revealing limitations in the Union's policy coherence.
Iran and Russia have both expressed reservations about Western-backed transit corridors, viewing them as encroachments on traditional spheres of influence. Both will likely seek mechanisms to influence or constrain TRIPP implementation.
China's engagement has expanded primarily through economic channels, particularly infrastructure projects like Georgia's Anaklia port. Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative positioning suggests pragmatic focus on connectivity rather than overt political intervention.
Key Uncertainties for 2026
Armenia's Electoral Outcome: The June 2026 elections represent the most consequential regional event. A Pashinyan victory would likely consolidate Armenia's Western orientation and the peace framework with Azerbaijan. His defeat would probably reverse both developments, potentially destabilizing regional arrangements. As International Crisis Group observed, shifts in the geopolitical environment could fundamentally reshape the security order in the South Caucasus.
Georgia's Trajectory: Whether Georgia continues its current path or experiences significant political change will affect alternative transport corridor viability. Russian influence over Georgia would diminish the Middle Corridor's appeal for Western interests seeking routes independent of Russian control.
TRIPP Implementation: The corridor's development faces substantial technical, financial, and political obstacles. Success requires sustained American commitment, Turkish cooperation, and regional stability. Delays or failures could undermine the broader peace framework.
Ukraine War: Russia's focus on and outcomes in Ukraine will significantly affect its capacity and approach in the South Caucasus. A Russian settlement in Ukraine could provide Moscow with renewed bandwidth to reassert influence southward. Continued Russian engagement in Ukraine may create opportunities for diversified regional partnerships.
Economic Performance: Sustained economic growth across all three countries would provide governments with political flexibility to pursue potentially controversial policies. Economic downturns particularly in hydrocarbon-dependent Azerbaijan or transit-dependent Georgia could destabilize current arrangements.
Regional Cooperation: Whether Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia can develop functional cooperation mechanisms or remain constrained by bilateral bargaining will shape long-term stability. The April 2025 Antalya Diplomacy Forum, where foreign ministers from all three countries expressed commitment to regional peace and cooperation, offered a rare moment of trilateral dialogue. Sustaining such engagement will be essential.
Conclusion: Peace as Process
Peace in the South Caucasus at the end of 2025 has emerged not as a singular condition but as a constellation of evolving arrangements, each reflecting distinct national trajectories, competing priorities, and complex negotiations between domestic imperatives and external pressures.
For Georgia, the very meaning of peace in 2026 remains contested. Even without active military conflict with external powers, the sustained use of force against protesters including chemical irritants, mass detentions, and documented cases of torture raises fundamental questions about whether a country experiencing systematic internal violence can truly be characterized as "at peace." The current situation combines absence of external military conflict with economic development, yet the balance between stability and pluralism has tilted decisively. The coming year will test whether this equilibrium proves sustainable, whether internal dynamics force adjustments, or whether the gap between the government's definition of peace (order and growth) and citizens' aspirations (freedom and European integration) becomes unbridgeable.
For Armenia, peace represents both historic opportunity and profound challenge. The conclusion of active conflict with Azerbaijan creates possibilities for regional integration and development, yet the political costs, territorial adjustments, constitutional changes, and difficult historical reckonings present significant domestic challenges. The 2026 elections will determine whether Armenians embrace the strategic transformation or seek alternative approaches.
For Azerbaijan, peace means consolidation of territorial restoration and positioning as a connectivity hub, though this occurs within a context of political centralization and limited pluralism. The question concerns whether Azerbaijan can convert territorial gains into sustained prosperity while maintaining internal stability and managing diverse external relationships.
Across the region, peace in 2026 will be tested by elections, infrastructure implementation, economic pressures, and competing external engagements. The optimistic scenario envisions gradual normalization, increased connectivity, economic development, and diminished conflict risk. Alternative scenarios involve electoral outcomes that alter strategic orientations, implementation challenges that undermine peace frameworks, or external pressures that constrain regional autonomy.
The South Caucasus stands at a genuine inflection point. Whether 2026 brings the region closer to sustainable peace or reveals the fragility of current arrangements remains genuinely uncertain. What appears clear is that peace in this region is not a static condition but an active, ongoing process requiring sustained commitment from both regional actors and international partners. The transformations of 2025 have created new possibilities whether these possibilities mature into durable peace will be determined by decisions and developments in the year ahead.
Elene Gagnidze is a Vienna based project and policy professional with a background in law, working on democracy, human rights, and governance related initiatives. She has practical experience in legal practice and international programme coordination, including stakeholder engagement and policy related analysis. Her work and analytical focus relate to democracy and governance in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the South and North Caucasus. She holds advanced degrees in public international law, public policy, and human rights.