These days we remember the Dayton Agreement, which stopped the Bosnian war that followed the breakdown of Yugoslavia. While we consider how successful and sustainable the Dayton Agreement was, President Trump has presented his plan for peace in Ukraine. The past – and partly still ongoing – conflict in and about Bosnia-Herzegovina is quite different from the war in Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is useful to compare the approach of the West, and particularly of the United States, toward these two conflicts. The different strategies for initiating peace talks in order to end the war show a dramatic change in U.S. attitudes toward resolving conflicts on European soil. There is much to learn for Europe. Today, the European Union is even more dependent on goodwill coming from Washington, D.C. Taking responsibility for one’s own security and thinking in longer terms has never been more urgent.
Trump’s Plan for Peace in Ukraine
Thomas L. Friedman called the 28-point plan for “peace” a disgrace in a recent article published by the New York Times. According to him, Donald Trump does not deserve the Nobel Peace Prize but rather the “Neville Chamberlain Peace Prize.” I fully agree. Christian Caryl argues similarly: “If the U.S.-Russia plan goes forward, Donald Trump will be remembered as the Neville Chamberlain of the 21st century.” Neville Chamberlain was the British prime minister who presumed that the 1938 Munich Agreement with Adolf Hitler would prevent war in Europe. The contrary was true: that agreement led directly into the Second World War. Since then, it should be clear what the consequences of an appeasement policy are. It creates short-term illusions of peace, while the aggressor is happy to have gained the first part of what they seek to achieve. Consequently, aggressors see such gains achieved through “negotiations” as the first step toward full-scale victory.
The negative evaluation of appeasement policies must not lead to an outright rejection of any compromise. But compromises and peace accords must, for their sustainability, include comprehensive and convincing measures to prevent a renewed attack by the original aggressor. One important element of such precautionary policies must be the capacity for self-defense by the victim against further aggression. Such agreements should also include clauses against revenge attacks. As morally justified or understandable as such actions might be, they would endanger the agreed compromise. It is true that the 28-point plan includes some elements of both. But the severe limits for the Ukrainian army have no corresponding limits for the Russian army. Additionally, the “security guarantees” promised by the United States are, in view of the erratic and transactional attitudes of Donald Trump, not trustworthy. His “special relations” with President Putin further weaken the promises given to Ukraine.
Donald Trump is no objective mediator. The interests of the U.S. – and even more his personal interests – dominate his actions. The opinion leader column in the Financial Times published on November 22nd bore the title: “Trump’s world view: cynical and self-interested.” It is Trump who is at the center of the plan, not the interests of the Ukrainians who have fought against Russian aggression. The character and content of the plan speak for themselves: “The true cynical, money-grabbing and self-interested nature of his world view was laid bare… the plan depicts peacemaking as a juicy business opportunity for America.”
The 28-point plan shows no respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and no respect for the hardship endured and the courage shown daily by the Ukrainian population and its army. It instead reveals Trump’s respect and understanding for his Russian “buddy,” who is similarly interested in personal power and economic benefit. Both treat their countries’ petty interests and gains for their personal wealth as major driving forces behind their policies.
Trump’s Peace Plan Compared with the Dayton Agreement
One should not be naïve and think that U.S. policy – or any other country’s policy – has never been connected to economic interests. But if you look at the Dayton Agreement, which ended the bloody conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the major stakeholders and negotiators from the West were led primarily by the desire to stop the war. They tried to achieve a fair agreement by balancing the interests of the conflicting parties. There was no dominating personal or economic interest; the aggressor was not rewarded, and the victim was not punished.
What may be similar is the non-solution of the deeper conflict. At Dayton, the negotiators found an agreement – elaborated by a strong and determined U.S. in cooperation with the Europeans (and Russia) – which stopped the war. But it did not solve the underlying issues. The negotiating parties created a constitutional framework that includes several possibilities for political blockades. And these were used immediately by some intransigent politicians – not only, but especially, representatives of Republika Srpska, such as Milorad Dodik, with his especially good relationship with President Putin. The lack of predominance of citizens’ interests and the primary focus on the three ethnic constituents is the major deficiency of the Dayton Agreement.
In the case of Ukraine, the 28-point plan leaves the aggressor, Russia, in a particularly strong position due to the appeasement attitude of Donald Trump and his negotiators. A settlement along the lines of the Trump plan will not solve the many issues created by the Russian aggression against Ukraine specifically, and against Europe in general. A permanent wound would be left open in the center of the European continent. One must fear that the Russian regime will not stop its hybrid attacks against various European institutions and facilities. The open issues and questions following such an extremely insufficient and one-sided “agreement” concerning Ukraine would be far more critical than the disputes inside Bosnia. And the ongoing conflict in the heart of Europe could even give new nourishment to the conflicts in the Western Balkans.
In a collection of short comments, Samuel Charap from RAND Corporation wrote: “The diplomacy we have seen thus far has been episodic, unstructured and highly public. But negotiation processes that successfully resolved past armed conflicts of similar intensity were continuous, structured and largely confidential… A final settlement will take many months, if not years, of structured negotiations to conclude.”
This would be the opportunity for Europeans once the fighting stops.
How Should Europe React?
It is doubtful that Europe could dramatically change the peace plan elaborated by the American and Russian negotiators. If any agreement – based on what has been agreed between the U.S. and Russia – were imposed on Ukraine, and if it at least stopped the actual fighting, Europe would have to deal with this new situation cleverly. Europe must intensify its vigilance against Putin’s imperial and aggressive behavior, but nevertheless try to establish contacts with those Russians who may express different opinions and approaches once the war ends. There is some chance that after the war stops, some Russian citizens will be ready to look more carefully, and with clearer eyes – and finally anger – at the disastrous results of Putin’s “special operation.”
Europe cannot forget or forgive all that Russian troops have done in Ukraine. But it must begin to open lines of communication with those in Russia who are ready to develop a different attitude toward security in Europe. It must use different organizations, for instance the OSCE in Vienna, to open such lines of communication. That will not be easy and will require a great deal of self-restraint. But the main concern must be the future of Europe’s security. In that respect, Europe has to re-establish military strength, but at the same time work toward multilateral agreements to limit the arms race and seek agreements on nuclear arms and the military use of AI. But all this can only be achieved by a united and determined European Union.
Stephen Sestanovich of ECFR wrote in his commentary in the New York Times: “What kept peace during the Cold War – and make no mistake, a new version of the Cold War surely lies ahead – was not NATO’s treaty pledge that an attack on one was an attack on all. The line between Europe’s two halves held for decades because the Western allies stayed strong, sustained by a network of political, economic, military, social, even cultural relationships and institutions.”
As the alliance with the United States becomes ever more fragile and insecure, the cohesion of the European Union will have to become even stronger and more effective.
P.S.: On December the third, at 6 pm we will have a discussion at IIP: “Peacebuilding After Dayton - Lessons for Today” For details: https://www.iipvienna.com/event-calendar/2025-12-03/peacebuilding-after-dayton-lessons-for-today-6fgke
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.