1975 - 1989/1992 - 2022 - 2024
When Olav Scholz, the short term German Chancellor, used the expression „Zeitenwende“ to describe the European world after the Russian invasion into Ukraine he probably did not expect, that this expression would find its place in many political comments and analytical articles from then on. Of course different Zeitenwenden cannot be related exactly to certain moments, they have their preparations and roots in the years before the actual turning points. But they mark and symbolize the beginning of a new area. And so Europe since 1945 has experienced different such Zeitenwenden with its new opportunities but also difficult challenges. Let’s start with the important Helsinki agreement, which had many consequences including the establishment of the OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
1st of August 1975
The Helsinki accord of 1975 was a milestone in the changes of Europe from a conflicting Cold War towards a Europa of peaceful cooperation - across national borders and ideological differences. This agreement between East and West became possible, because both sides realized that changing the borders could result in another war, and this time in a nuclear disaster. A mixture of deterrence and detente promoted by responsible leaders of both side lead to the Helsinki agreements. Western governments were ready to accept the divisions after the Jalta agreement as “permanent”. In exchange the Eastern governments, under leadership of the Soviet Union, were ready to accept some obligations to grant their citizens basic civic rights. Only in West-Germany you could find some politicians who still worked for German reunification, but they did it in a soft and sophisticated way (I always ask representatives from the Republic of Cyprus to learn from that example).
Anyway, the agreement of 1975 was embedded in a geopolitical atmosphere which made such a compromise possible. And it animated civil society forces in the communist countries, to use the promises of “their” governments to ask for basic civic rights. These demands and respective protests - in connection with unfulfilled economic promises - finally resulted in a breakdown of the communist regimes and the Soviet Union. Systems which were built on promises they did not respect had to fail. This is especially the case, when the discrepancy between the official ideology and the realty is too big and clearly visible. Communism did not lead to a just society built on solidarity and economic welfare for all. And the Soviet Union did not respect national interests inside the Union and those of their “brother countries” of the Eastern European block. ( See also my IIP Peace blog:“For Peace in Europe another Helsinki Conference?)
1989/1991
All these neglects and deficiencies lead to another Zeitenwende in the years 1989 to 1991, with the breakdown of the Soviet Union. In the following years the former Soviet satellites became members of NATO and the European Union. The critical issue was and became more and more the non-inclusion of Russia in the Western/European alliances. There were offers both by NATO and EU, but they were not offers of full inclusion but lose cooperation. And there was no elaborate proposal coming from the Russian side about a common future either. For neither side was it easy to find a new start for a sincere and close relationship.
Several countries who suffered particularly from the Soviet imperial domination and cruel violence towards its citizens, especially the Baltic countries, were not interested to find itself in a community with Russia as one of its leading members. And Russia itself wanted to have - according to its size and historical importance - a special role. Russia did not want to be a member of EU and/or NATO as many others, it wanted its privileges and it was not ready to separate itself from the imperial past.
Very few politicians and intellectuals argued for a construction and development of a common “European House” as it was proposed by Gorbatschow. But it was not taken up and filled with content. The result was a new ideological and political dividing line between the West and specifically between NATO and the European Union on the one side and Russia on the other side. And with Putin taking over the leadership - as President, then as Prime Minister and then as President again - the Russian political system changed its course towards a oligarchic autocracy with himself as the only decisive political authority.
February 2022
The growing autocracy and aggressive attitude of the Russian leadership, which influenced also decisively the thinking and attitudes of the Russian society, lead to a new Russian imperialism. What started already with President Jelzin became a fundamental in President Putin‘s Russia. Putin was not ready to accept the results of 1989/1991 and created or at least supported conflicts in its neighborhood in order to de-stabilize Russia’s neighborhood. This gave him the legitimacy to intervene in these countries in the „interest of Russians speaking peoples“. Putin wanted to have at least a co-decision and veto power in Russia‘s neighborhood. Special attention was given to developments in Ukraine, a country which Putin regarded as an integral part of the Russian world, a world to be governed by Moscow.
The Russian overall attack against Ukraine starting in February 2022 had its preparations by occupying the Crimea and the infiltration of Russian fighters into the Donbas region. Nevertheless the massive mobilization of the Russian military forces and the merciless bombing of Ukrainian cities was a game changer which brought the German chancellor to use the word Zeitenwende to argue for a change in the defence policy and expenditures. The time when Europe and especially Germany could consume the peace dividend because the Cold War was finished, was itself brought to its end - due to the Russian full scale invasion.
5th of November 2024
The Russian invasion was a huge challenge for the Western community, which again and again resulted in differences inside Europe but also between European governments and the Biden administration about how and how strongly to support Ukraine with weapons. But overall they was a common willingness to strengthen the Ukrainian self-defence. This changed with the election of Donald Trump as President. But the changes did and do not only affect the Ukrainian defence against Russian aggression. For Trump, Europe is generally not an important partner but rather an obstacle for his policy of making deals with individual countries in his - often also personal - interest. He wants to use his full strength against all individual countries. And generally he is absolutely determined to undermine international institutions and multilateral organizations.
As he is convinced that the US - under his leadership - is the “god given” major power, he sees these institutions preventing the development and use of the full US power in world politics. The European Union is one of these powers and it is an entity which is keen on working with and within the framework of organization like the UN, the WTO, the WHO etc. It is obvious that the European Union could develop its world wide role best in a world of multilateralism and the rule of law. But it is equally obvious that the US with Trump as President can develop its capacity best in a world of power games and nationalism. Trump feels himself more easy and at home in a world where he is confronted with other leaders who are equally keen on national and personal power like Putin and Xi Xiping. And one can add Netanyahu, Bolsonaro and similar leaders. This is the world where he hopes to be able to make a deal.
Joint challenge for European security
The Russian aggression against Ukraine and its hybrid attacks against the European Union and Trumps hesitation about support for Europe’s defence inside NATO is a strong blow against European security. The decisions of the recent NATO summit to raise the defence expenditures of European NATO countries is one answer, but an answer with many question marks. Yes, European governments and specifically the European Union has to react to the Russian aggression and to the uncertainties coming from Washington. That must also be translated into military expenditures. Especial if we take into account the strange alliances of todays Russia with North Korea and Iran, and not to forget China.
But if it should be sustainable and efficient, defence must be organized in a sophisticated way. The rise of the military expenditures must be only one part of strengthening security. Promoting security is a comprehensive undertaking which must include a variety of measures and activities from public communication, developing an efficient cyber protection policy, supporting economic security and a policy of de-risking by reducing dependence on vital suppliers etc. In addition, Europe should never forget, that in the long run the best defence policy must include ideas and proposals of disarmament, especially concerning nuclear arms. Europe should have a strong interest in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.( See also my IIP Peace blog:”NATO summit 2025:More questions than answers)
China, a longterm game changer
When regarding overall security we must include China in our considerations. We can not define a specific date, when China’s economic (and military) strength started to be a decisive challenge for the European Union. Looking at China’s strategy, especially at its Belt and Road initiative, its dominant role in the BRICS community and its multiple support for Russia in its war against Ukraine, we should not have any doubt about its strategic aims. China is longing for a global leadership parallel to the one of the United States. As China is for the US and especially Donald Trump the main adversary, competitor and possible partner, the US plays for China a similar critical role.
Both use economic instruments like tariffs and export restriction to gain political influence. Both have in this respect advantages in relation to each other and especially in relation to the European Union. As the Global Capital Allocation Project in their study on today’s hegemonies underline, China has hegemonic control of manufacturing - including over key supply chains concerning rare earth and other critical materials - and the U.S. has hegemonic control of finance. In addition both have a leading and often hegemonic control of new technologies.
Europe is in a weaker position in all these fields. These disadvantages are not only weakening Europe’s role on international markets but will also affect the economic and social future of Europe and its capacity to satisfy and comfort its citizens. Already now we see how Donald Trump is threatening the European Union with particular high tariffs and how China is threatening European countries with export restrictions concerning critical materials. And inside the Europe Union already the blame game started in discussing who inside the European Union is responsible for our failing negotiations positions.
Europe is also confronted with two very different approaches towards climate change by the US and China. Whereas China is increasingly investing in solar and wind energy, while sill producing much energy by burning coal, the US under the Trump administration is relying heavenly on hydrocarbon. And Europe starts to discuss again what kind of climate and specifically energy policy it should promote, instead of keeping course in the direction of energy saving and de-carbonization of its energy supply - maybe with less detailed regulation but with strong incentives for innovation especially concerning energy storage.
How to win Europe’s future
The historian and political commentator Timothy Garton Ash speaks in his contribution „The fight for Europe‘s Future“ in the Financial Times Weekend Edition (28/29.6.) of „the Putin Shock, Xi shock and Trump shock“. All these leaders have an important influence on the domestic political scenes in European countries. This is especially true for Donald Trump. Garton Ash speaks in this respect of a political battle between two Europes. He refers to an extensive opinion poll organized by the European Council for Foreign Relations - ECFR, which shows two differ approaches towards how to deal with Trump‘s policies.
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonhard from ECFR in interpreting the responses to the questions of the poll, came to the conclusion that “ Europe’s far right forces are transforming from self-styled defenders of national sovereignty into continental vanguard of a transnational revolutionary movement - aligning themselves with Trump’s bid to remake global order. At the same time, several mainstream parties (supposedly more internationalist) appear to be recasting themselves as the new sovereigntists, defenders of national dignity against ideological interference from Washington.”
Independently how strong “Trump’s European revolution” de facto is and how strongly this revolution is connected to Putin’s influence in right wing circles, it makes a common European geopolitical strategy very difficult. The European Union has to deal at the same time with the outside shocks and the new global orientations of different domestic scenes towards Washington and Moscow and partly also towards Beijing.
It will not be possible to develop and implement a concise and convincing strategy without an extended and frank communications with the national political stakeholders and also citizens at large in all member countries. It is a huge task for the European Commission and the European Parliamentarians. But without that endeavor it will not be able to win a future for a Europe, able to compete with the US and China economically and with Russia politically and security wise.
There is - at least for the immediate future - no way back to the spirit of 1975. The world changed too much for convening a new Helsinki conference and reach respective agreements. But an extension of the present military confrontation in the heart of Europe must be avoided. A strong and common Europe must be based on additional defence spending but must at the same time develop an overall security concept including economic and social security. And it must include the defence of Europe’s basic values obtained in the last decades. There is much more to defend beyond the territories established after so many wars in Europe. Such a comprehensive concept of defence must be the basis for a broad communication and discussion with all political national and Europe-wide stakeholders and the citizens.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.