The recent NATO summit was hailed as a success, especially by its Secretary General and Donald Trump! As different as they are, both rely heavily on efficient public relations. As the Washington Post titled on June 26th: “Trump embraces NATO over vows to surge spending – Summit tailor made to please President”! This was primarily a success of Mark Rutte’s diplomacy. We will see how long that support for NATO by Trump will hold.
From peace dividend to 5 percent
Anyway, figures have been announced! The defence expenditure of NATO countries should be raised to 5% of GDP: 3.5% for military equipment and the rest for infrastructure, cyber defence, etc. The latter spending of 1.5% would certainly have a dual-use effect and the wider public could benefit from it. Nevertheless, the reorganisation of European defence is not so much about numbers but about content.
The increase in defence expenditures has been demanded by President Trump and before him by several of his predecessors. But it became necessary—and here I agree—because Russia, under the authoritarian leadership of President Putin, started an aggressive war against its neighbours, especially Ukraine. We may differ about the deeper reasons and causes of the conflict, but Russia’s aggressive and militarized foreign and neighborhood policy is a fact. Russia is also increasingly allied with other authoritarian and aggressive countries like Iran and North Korea. They are supporting Russia by delivering weapons and know-how. While Europe fears losing its prime ally, the U.S., Russia is gaining allies including China.
But how strongly is the threat perception—underlying the rise in defence expenditure—shared among NATO member countries? What about the US itself? Orban and Fico—what do they think and say about Russia during NATO meetings? Also, some countries in Southern Europe, like Spain, have different opinions about the likelihood and danger of a Russian attack against a NATO country.
As Lykke Friis mentioned in her opening speech at the European Council for Foreign Relations meeting in Warsaw, one can describe the change as “from peace dividend to 5 percent.” Russia forced the West, especially Europe, to start and implement that transformation. But it needs a policy that guarantees the money is well and carefully spent, and that the public can be convinced of the necessity of that transformation.
Spending for what?
One decisive question is how the money that different countries will dedicate to these purposes will be spent. Does the NATO headquarters—and specifically the Secretary General—know (and do members agree) what the deficiencies and necessities of European defence are? Which country should contribute in which way to fill the gaps and offer the necessary capabilities? And how can the money be spent without it simply boosting defence industry profits due to rising prices?
The most recent and most sophisticated study about European defence is the Kiel Report published in June 2025, just days before the NATO summit, by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy together with the Bruegel Institute. Here we can read:
“Unlocking significant financing at the European and national levels is welcome, but spending needs to translate into capabilities and sustained growth in European force generation, sustainment, and military modernisation. Put differently, Europe needs to shift its societal debate from fiscal numbers to actual fiscal capabilities needed, i.e., how to purchase and produce what is actually needed to be successful on the modern battlefield and how to ensure timely delivery with concrete targets for closing critical gaps.”
The Kiel Report concludes that while European defence expenditures have increased in recent years, they have not closed key gaps vis-à-vis Russia’s quantitative and qualitative capability growth. The report underlines that “access to European strategic enablers will be critical. These include a variety of systems that European militaries either have in limited numbers compared to the US or Russia, or not at all.” This refers to 6th generation aircraft, integrated air and missile defence, satellite systems—especially for surveillance and reconnaissance, among others.
Is the US still an ally?
The necessary defence expenditure will definitely also depend on the US military presence in Europe and its readiness to remain an important ally. But we do not know much about this. Certain expenditures in catching up with Russia are necessary anyway, but how far can and should NATO and the EU plan future European defence without the US?
The Kiel Report states in this respect:
“Reducing dependency on US systems and the overstretched US defence industrial base will be a challenge.” And it adds:
“For Europe to reduce its still very high technological dependency on the US defence industrial base for key technologies, major investments into research and development efforts will be needed.”
Basically, it will be difficult to balance between keeping the US on board by buying military equipment from the US and the demand of Europeans to buy more from within Europe. And how much should be spent on EU–US joint ventures? All these questions remain unanswered after the last NATO summit.
How to win public support?
Finally, we come to the existential question for European defence: How can European NATO countries—or EU countries more broadly—convince their citizens that a significant increase in defence expenditures is necessary?
The extreme right, which was formerly often aggressively militaristic, has—as populists—become the new pacifists. As such, they express and call for appeasement toward Russia. Russia itself is heavily engaged in influencing citizens, especially via social media, and there is no serious defence against this sophisticated propaganda.
At any rate, I do not see any strategy to influence and convince ordinary citizens of the necessity to strengthen defence capabilities. Without such a strategy, the results of the NATO summit could collapse in a few years like a house of cards. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte is skilled at pleasing Trump, mediating, and conducting public relations. But he must develop a strategy to communicate directly with citizens. The EU must do the same. This must be done without dramatizing the threats and by presenting realistic, possible developments.
As a recent opinion poll across European countries organized by the European Council for Foreign Relations shows, many European citizens feel highly insecure. But this feeling leads some to support more defence expenditures, while others see these expenditures as contributing to insecurity. As a Russia expert told me, “We have two Europes.”
Of course, efforts to convince citizens must be backed by policies that do not substitute social policy—and especially social and regional cohesion policy—with defence spending. Voter support for defence investments must be connected to policies that support those who feel left behind by national and European policies. Even Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, who represents a country that spends nearly 5% of GDP on defence, recently emphasized that security must include social security.
The possibility of a Russian attack must be taken into account and discussed—not the certainty of it. Security means preventing possible attacks and maintaining peace through precautionary strength. And even if it is for now only a wish without a willing partner, it must be clear that diplomatic efforts—even small and narrow channels of communication with Russia—must be pursued. That sincere readiness must be expressed in parallel with a well-argued and sophisticated increase in defence expenditures.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.