Europe has had to realize a “Zeitenwende” twice. The first with the outright Russian aggression against Ukraine. The second came with the inauguration of Donald Trump as the new U.S. president. Europe’s neighbor Russia and its ally the United States, both are - in different ways - challenging a Europe which wants peace on its continent built on a strong transatlantic alliance. Russia is still our neighbor and Europe - economically and militarily - is closely connected with the U.S. Nevertheless, Europe has to look for new partners around the globe. The challenges posed by Russia and the United States are too long-term and decisive to neglect.
Fall in love with China?
One of the big possible alternative partners is certainly China. Recent opinion polls like that of the European Council for Foreign Affairs (ECFR) show a clear tendency, also of Europeans, to see in China a strong country we should get closer to. The corresponding policy brief by the ECFR was titled: „How Trump is making China great again - and what it means for Europe“.One of the commentators of the opinion poll, Ivan Krastev stated: “Trump is making us all fall in love with China” (Financial Times 17./18.01.2026).
But what kind of China would we fall in love with? Dan Wang, a fellow at the Hoover History Lab at Stanford University, wrote recently a widely read and praised book: “Breakneck” with the subtitle “China’s Quest to Engineer the Future”. In particular he compares China to the United States: ”The United States has immense advantages over China: robust economic growth, an expanding and more youthful population, innovation in digital technologies, a larger network of alliances, and more. But we need to recognize that the engineering state has a giant advantage: China can build. That will matter if the two countries ever decide, in an apocalyptic scenario, to go to war. No military can be powered by artificial intelligence alone; it will need drones and munitions. And the engineering state is better set up to produce these in overwhelming quantity.”
And a quite darwinistic approach by the leadership is supporting the engineering state. In this connection Dan Wang cites a speech of Xi Jiping of 2021 in which he said: „Even when we have reached a higher level of development ….we should not go overboard with social transfer. For we must avoid letting people get lazy from their sense of entitlement to welfare.” Very few European politicians would allow themselves to express this attitude towards the welfare state. The Chinese leadership needs its citizens to be fully engaged in promoting industrial development but also new technologies in order to compete successfully with the other leading powers. China should always be a “developing country”, according to Dan Wang, and he advises the US to do the same. “Isn’t it better than to be a “developed” one, which implies that you’re done finished, at the end of the road? Leave “developed” status, I say to Europe’s beautiful mausoleum economy.”
Well, it is not the purpose of this article to go deeper into the question how far Europe is indeed a “mausoleum economy”. Furthermore, also China has economic and social problems which should not be underestimated. But certainly, it was and is a country which is trying to build and engineer the future. China is installing about two thirds of the world’s new wind and solar capacity, it manufactures 60 percent of the world’s wind turbines and it has a lead in producing electric vehicles, batteries and drones, but in the meantime also in the field of robotics. In respect to energy, Dan Wang titled his recent article in the New York Times - International Edition (21.01.2026) “While the President craves Oil, China is building the electric age”.
Chinese leaders want to deliver
But as the Chinese-American freelance writer Kaiser Kuo writes in his “The Great Reckoning” (The Ideas Letter, October 16, 2025), “China is simultaneously the world’s largest emitter of carbon and the largest builder of renewable energy capacity; it installs more solar and wind power each year than the rest of the world. That contradiction contains a lesson: legitimacy in this century will not flow from ideological purity but from the messy, uneven, urgent capacity to deliver. Systems will be judged not by the elegance of their theories but by their ability to meet existential challenges.”
This is certainly something we should learn in Europe: to neglect the difficulties of the transition from a hydro-carbon economy to a sustainable renewable energy system is dangerous. Yes, as China demonstrates - in contradiction to Trump’s backward policy - it is paramount to build the electric age. But the political and economic system has to deliver acceptable results for the citizens at large and also care for some clarity about the future developments. As several opinion polls show the citizens are overwhelmed by too many uncertainties, especially also concerning the future energy system. So, we definitely should and can learn from China.
Of course, China and the Chinese people find themselves in a different position than the US-citizens and even more so in comparison to the Europeans. China was already in the years around 1850 the leading economic power of the world. But it had enforced upon itself a rather isolationist policy, full of skepticism towards the “outside” world. But the European imperial powers, especially England did not like this self-isolation of China. And with brutal economic coercion and also military intervention China was forced to give up its resistance against globalization. This trauma, then the Japanese occupation but also the conflicts of the Chinese Communist Party with its ideological brothers in Moscow, confirmed the conviction of the Chinese leaders to go its own way.
Economy first
After several ideologically founded disasters - promoted and supported by Mao Zedong - the Chinese leadership came to the conviction, that only a strong economic and technologically supported growth will save the country’s independence. And today - as Kaiser Kuo underlines - we see a Chinese population which has “grown up in a country that is already technologically advanced, globally consequential, and proud of its achievements. They see China’s ability to weather trade wars, leap ahead in artificial intelligence, and build infrastructure on a continental scale, and they take it as given that China belongs in the front ranks of nations.”
But where does this strength and determination to be one of the leading economic powers lead to, especially as we see that China is ready to weaponize its economic assets, for example by means of export restrictions in the field of critical minerals. But there is the general question to be asked: what kind of role such aspiring and forward developing country with a strong authoritarian leadership wants to play? Xi Jinping has promoted several concepts for a common global civilizational development. But are they only meant to hide Chinese efforts to “rule the world”?
Aspiring to rule the world?
Jeremy S. Friedman from Harvard Business School argues in his article “How Far Do China’s Ambitions Reach?” (Foreign Policy 21.01.2026): “The notion that China wants to replace the United States as global hegemon and write the rules of the road for the international system fails for two reasons. First, China has benefited - and continues to benefit - from many of these rules. Second, China has shown little interest in assuming the duties of a hegemon.” But he adds: “China does not aspire to write all the rules of the international system, but it does want the power to revise or veto the rules that conflict with its interests.”
Of course, with its economic strength and respective weaponization of power it is able to influence the rules of the game. And this has direct consequences on the global economy, also for Europe. “The effect is to allow China to race unimpeded toward monopolistic domination of a wide range of economic sectors. Already, China’s export surpluses are squeezing the traditional development pathway for many emerging economies. This has security ramifications: it hollows out crucial industrial capacities and augments China‘s coercive power. It also has political implications: the geographic concentration and speed of the impact in traditional European industrial heartland bolsters the rise of extremist parties.” One should be not naive, China as a great power with a long history always on its mind, is never an easy partner. Chinese political and economic leaders have clear interests and are set to represent and enforce them - maybe without wanting to play the big hegemon which would come with responsibilities anyway.
During my few visits to China - including participating at a discussion with Xi Jinping when he was still the Crown Prince - I always recognized and admired the long-term strategies the leadership was promoting and implementing. Insofar I fully agree with Henry Kissinger’s evaluation when he writes in “On China”: “In no other country is it conceivable that modern leaders would initiate a major national undertaking by invoking strategic principles from a millennium-old event - nor that he would confidently expect his colleagues to understand the significance of his illusions. Yet China is singular. No other country can claim so long a continuous civilization or such an intimate link to its ancient past and classical principles of strategy and statesmanship.” What was true for former emperors like the unifier Qin Shi Huang, was true for Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping and is now valid for Xi Jinping. Strong leaders do make a difference when they implement a strategy of building an empire and a vital and competitive economy. Anyway, we have to take note that also an authoritarian system can deliver results.
In this connection Jennifer Lind, professor at Dartmouth College underlines the limited effectiveness of “smart authoritarianism”: “Pursuing what I call “smart authoritarianism”, the Chinese Communist Party adapted its tools of authoritarian control to meet the demands of the globalized Information Age. Beijing found ways to provide freedom to entrepreneurs and innovators while inhibiting collective action and restraining passions that might imperil the regime. In its efforts to maintain political control, the CCP sacrificed some growth that may have been possible under a freer system. But the party created enough space to foster innovation without loosening its hold on power.” (“China’s Smart Authoritarianism” in Foreign Affairs, February 10,2026) Consequently, Europe should use democracy and its freedoms of science and research to foster innovation and combine it with a deliberate economic and especially industrial policy. We should take up the competition with the Chinese authoritarian system and demonstrate, that also democracies can deliver, even while sticking to our values, principles and the way of life.
How should Europe deal with China?
Recognizing the singularity of China’s political culture and economic strength does not imply to accept all Chinese interests. But to approach it as any other country which can be bullied around is naive and must fail. The human rights situation and especially the treatment of the Uighur people is terrible and should always be raised. However, one cannot build an effective and useful for Europe China policy only on the basis of criticism of the domestic human rights issues. As Kaiser Kuo writes in his comment: “Coming to terms with China doesn’t require abandoning one’s own values or surrendering one’s aspirations. But it does require that the rest of us hold them more lightly, argue for them more persuasively, and demonstrate their worth through performance rather than proclamation. If liberal democracy and market capitalism are indeed superior forms of organization, they should be able to prove that through results, not rhetoric.”
In addition, it is absolutely necessary to extend political and economic relations to all other Asian countries, especially to countries that are not always in line with the Chinese policies. India, Japan, South Korea and others are also important trade and security partners and must be included in the respective global networking of the European Union. China is an important partner in many ways, not least because of its huge market. It will be necessary to be pragmatic and that means to be vigilant and cautious but also open-minded in looking for possible cooperation. Cautious and vigilant insofar as we have to de-risk concerning economic and political dependencies - including one-sided and involuntary data-transfer to China. But Europe should also look for chances for fair cooperation, for example in science and research. One should not overlook, that the recent ranking of universities by the University of Leiden lists eight Chinese schools in the top ten! Even if some of these universities produce more quantity than quality - China was producing and is still developing a very competitive educational system. Without copying such a system Europe could develop a system of incentives for excellence, supporting the respective students - including exchange programs with China. One additional globally important issue for cooperation would be to develop and promote coordinated climate policies. Also concerning artificial intelligence some cooperation is possible. But here again we have to see the limits when it comes to the issues of opinions and values to be expressed by the different agents.
It is definitely not about to fall in love with China, although it is a fascinating country. Europe must stay pragmatic and realistic. It must avoid being the dumping ground for the Chinese oversupply of cheap goods due to over-investment in China. As the traditional correction mechanism of exchange rate adaption - appreciation of the renminbi - is anathema to the Chinese, Europe has to use other instruments to prevent a too strong imbalance to the detriment of Europe. And European should carefully watch what Vladimir Shopov, Visiting Fellow at the ECFR, calls a “more diffuse, company-centered strategy that quietly embed Chinese firms and value chains across sectors in other countries”. And he adds, that “China’s evolving foreign economic strategy - firm driven, diversified, and macro-integrated - poses stealthier risks to EU industries than the old, loan-heavy, mega project tactics, which at least made the dangers obvious.” (ECFR 05.02.2026)
On the other hand Europe should not fall into the trap of a protectionist policy. Competition is necessary if European economy wants to prevail globally. Competition and cooperation with China on a fair basis are the best Europe could achieve. This should be done irrespective of the kind of relationship the United States is aspiring to have with Europe or is developing with China.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.