During the recent visit of an IIP delegation to the South Caucasus, I asked a civil society representative to describe Georgia in a few words. She answered: “Georgia is a small country in the South Caucasus, which wants to leave the Russian orbit and become part of the civilized world.” This description provides a concise summary of my impressions after two days of intensive discussions in Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi. According to our interlocutors, today’s Georgia must decide between a backward-looking orientation based on the old Russian model and a forward-looking orientation toward a more Western modernity.
Georgia and Russia
Georgia has for a long time – at the very least since the breakdown of the Soviet Union – had a tense relationship with Russia. Oftentimes, the fact that Joseph Stalin and Lavrentiy Beria came from Georgia is interpreted to mean that Georgia must be deeply pro-Russian. However, the Soviet Union’s brutal intervention in Georgia on April 9, 1989 (“The massacre of Tbilisi”) is more representative of contemporary Russia-Georgia relations. But even before that tragic event, tensions between the two countries were much more emblematic than the origins of the two Soviet leaders. In addition, many critical artists and intellectuals were of Georgian origin. One such example is Otar Chkhartishvili, who organized a famous exposition of nonconformist artists in Moscow in 1974 known as the “Bulldozer Exhibition” – named after its immediate destruction by the bulldozers of the Soviet security forces. In several museums across Tbilisi, the work of Chkhartishvili and other dissidents are still on display, reminding visitors of the tragic history of Soviet times. In modern Georgian literature too, Russia’s influence remains an important subject – as are the corrupt and criminal groups established after the breakdown of the Soviet Union that have their roots in that system. A very good example of literature dealing with this phenomenon is the work of Nino Haratischwili.
Thomas de Waal, the expert on the South Caucasus, explained it in this way: ”While in Armenia and Azerbaijan many activists blamed the other side rather than Moscow, the Georgian movement took an openly anti-Russian and anti-Soviet line from the beginning - for Georgians the ‘other’ was Moscow itself.” The relationship between Georgia and Russia deteriorated during the turmoil of Georgia’s independence and was particularly strained when Russia used – or rather misused – the ethnic conflicts within Georgia in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This led to Russia’s de-facto occupation of these territories and its subsequent provision of Russian passports to the citizens of the two breakaway regions. But even after the short war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the attitude of Georgia’s population towards Russia was not as negative as it is now, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Today’s Tbilisi is full of anti-Russia and pro-Ukraine graffiti.
Russia is now viewed as a country that does not accept the new realities of independent countries that have sovereign rights. It is viewed as a country that is itself authoritarian while also supporting other authoritarian regimes. It promotes traditional values and rejects “Western” attitudes towards sexual freedoms. In this respect, it is aligning itself with the conservative leadership of the Orthodox Church – in Russia, but also in Georgia. Moreover, as many Russian experts explain, one of the root causes of Russia’s actions is the presence of force and violence within official institutions, especially the military. This can be witnessed on a daily basis in its war against Ukraine.
These backward-oriented policies stand in contrast to Western values and principles. Of course, not all elements of the policies supported by Russia or Putin are rejected equally by all Georgians. In addition, inside the European Union (EU), we also unfortunately have tendencies that I would characterize as reactionary and threatening to democracy – in Poland and Hungary as well as partially in Italy, these attitudes are official policy. In this respect, it is not surprising that the leadership of the ruling Georgian Dream party has very a close relationship with Hungary’s Viktor Orban. In contrast to the authoritarian tendencies promoted by their government, the population of Georgia wants a clear course towards membership in the EU. For this majority, Russia’s foreign and domestic policies are clearly backward-oriented and the West is the future that they want to belong to.
Divides Between the Government and the People
In view of that majoritarian opinion, one would expect that the Georgian government would support and pursue the public’s general orientation and, in particular, try its hardest to fulfill the conditions set by the EU for Georgia to receive official candidate status – which it recently awarded to Ukraine and Moldova. However, the reality is the exact opposite. The government in Tbilisi has been exceedingly hesitant to implement the necessary reforms. In fact, Georgia’s prime minister recently signed an agreement of strategic partnership with China. Concerning Russia, the Georgian government has sought to avoid any criticism of the war in Ukraine and has not allowed Russian citizens who publicly criticize Putin to enter Georgia. Furthermore, Georgian critics of Putin’s aggression against Ukraine are accused of pushing Georgia into the war.
Another sign of Georgia’s growing dependence on Russia is its increasing trade in goods – either directly or indirectly with countries that have expanded their respective trade levels with Russia. In reality, there is no benefit for Georgia from this policy. However, it seems that the real head of both government and the parliamentary majority – oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili – maintains vested interests in Russia and fears the Western orientation of his country. Given that Ivanishvili has enough wealth to effectively buy voters for his Georgian Dream party, he can still hope to win the next elections in 2024.
Such an outcome could be only prevented if several of Georgia’s smaller opposition parties would cooperate in order to surpass the 5% threshold necessary to win seats in the parliament. Moreover, they would have to present – in addition to a clear pro-Western position – proposals that address the most urgent issues of ordinary Georgian citizens, such as poverty and unemployment. However, the programmatic work of the different opposition parties remains rather weak.
(Problematic) Leaders Instead of Programs
It is generally said that Georgia has long been heavily influenced and dominated by single – oftentimes problematic – personalities. On the one hand, there is Bidzina (Ivanishvili), the de-facto head of the current ruling Georgian Dream party, while on the other there is Misha (Mikheil Saakashvili), who was imprisoned after a not-so-successful career in Ukraine (the common use of their first names is another sign of the prevalence of leaders over programs in Georgian politics). The two remain deeply opposed, and Misha is in many ways the opposite of Bidzina, as he is fiercely anti-Russian. Bidzina once said in regards to Misha that he had been “waving Georgian NATO membership in front of Russia’s eyes like waving a red cloth in front of a bull.”
I had many discussions – or rather, friendly disputes – when Misha was President of Georgia. He implemented many positive reforms, especially against low-level corruption. But he became an increasingly authoritarian ruler and sought to influence the justice system according to his personal evaluation of right and wrong. Many Georgians – even those who detest Bidzina – are not keen to see Misha return to politics, as they fear that the vicious cycle of revenge will go on. Only this time, it would be Misha and his party, the United National Movement, that would punish Ivanishvili and his party, and not the other way round, as it was when Misha lost.
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ukraine
It was also Misha who, instead of trying to find a compromise solution for the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, inflamed the crisis and provoked a Russian military intervention in 2008, which went on to threaten Tbilisi itself. There are many voices who argue that the EU should have recognized the true face of Putinism back in 2008. I too ask myself if it was enough to criticize Russia – as I did in the European Parliament – but not ask for more decisive actions.
I distinctly remember a meeting at the Elysée Palace in August 2008, to which French President Nicolas Sarkozy had invited the leaders of the political groups in the European Parliament (I represented Martin Schulz, who was unable to come). Sarkozy described the talks that he, as acting President of the European Council, had conducted with Putin in Moscow. As Saakashvili was at least directly or indirectly co-responsible for the outbreak of the conflict in Georgia, Sarkozy and the EU could not place full blame on Putin. Therefore, the ceasefire that was later negotiated seemed to be an acceptable solution.
In a draft resolution that I presented to the European Parliament together with some colleagues, we tried to mention the misbehavior of Saakashvili while strongly criticizing Russia. We condemned the “military intervention by Georgia in its region of South Ossetia on August 8 and the brutal and disproportionate reaction by Russia to this assault which targeted both civilian and economic infrastructures in clear violation of international law.” We also called upon Russia “to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and the inviolability of its international border.” But Putin had other ideas in mind, as he used the ethnic conflicts to extend Russia’s de-facto territory as well as his political influence.
Either way, this conflict cannot not be compared to Russia’s outright aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, for which there was no basis. Ukraine did not provoke the conflict, and there were no ethnic disputes comparable to those that Georgia faced with Abkhazians and South Ossetians. As Thomas de Waal wrote in his well-known and well-researched book The Caucasus about the situation at the beginning of the 1990s: “All Georgia’s minorities, not just Abkhaz and Ossetians but also Armenians and Azeris, complained of discrimination.” At the time, many politicians and intellectuals spread ethnic prejudice and hatred, especially in relation to South Ossetians. Georgian nationalism prevailed over a pragmatic recognition of ethnic peculiarities and rights.
Candidate Status?
As important as both its history as well as its development since independence are, Georgia must now look toward the future. Moreover, as Russia holds a very different perspective towards the future than the West – especially the EU – does, it is essential that Georgia decide which direction to go. Needless to say, it is primarily up to the Georgian people to decide. But the difficulty is that the country itself is divided. Who speaks for the real Georgia? On the one side stands the government, with a position that refrains from criticizing Russia, blames Ukraine for the war, deepens its trade with Russia, and signs a strategic partnership agreement with China. On the other side is the majority of the population. Their aspirations to more closely align with the EU are actively supported by Georgia’s president, Salome Zourabichvili, who is now threatened with impeachment. She is accused of traveling to EU countries in order to support Georgia’s official policy to gain EU candidate status without first getting the government’s consent.
Now the EU – and especially the European Council – must decide who it should consider to be the “true” Georgia. All interlocutors we met in Georgia pleaded for a positive decision by the Council at its meeting at the end of 2023 – even if the government would interpret the decision as its own victory. But Georgian civil society and opposition groups want a clear decision in support of the majority. They want to be respected as part of the West. For the time being, candidate status would be the best signal in that direction.
Of course, the West – and the EU in particular – has its own interests in the South Caucuses, especially in Georgia. The country could be a decisive ally for preventing Russian influence from growing in the South Caucasus. It is also important given the EU’s increasing interest in energy supplies from Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, especially from Turkmenistan. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the so-called Middle Corridor providing alternative transport through Georgia has grown increasingly valuable. These transport links are of course not only important for the EU but would also bring benefits to China by connecting it with the Middle East and Europe. In this respect, Georgia’s aforementioned strategic partnership with China could further strengthen the importance of the Middle Corridor. The question remains over how many political conditions are connected to Chinese investments.
Even if energy arriving through Georgia can only meet a small percentage of overall EU demand – and it must include sustainable forms of energy, such as hydrogen – it will remain important for some EU countries. But although the transport infrastructure in Georgia and neighboring Azerbaijan has been improved, huge amounts of additional investment are necessary to make the Middle Corridor a well-functioning global transit nexus. Furthermore, the Caspian Sea is still not easy to cross. Even when all legal issues have been resolved, Russia will continue to use environmental issues as arguments against the rapid implementation of new projects.
Georgia’s road to the EU will remain bumpy. Many physical and ideological constraints must first be overcome. In addition, the EU itself must consider the pro and cons of granting Georgia candidate status this year. It must weigh both geopolitical interests as well as its own values. It must also balance the aspirations of the Georgian people against their government’s reluctance to implement the necessary reforms. Finally, it must consider the best way to counter Russia’s influence in the region. Personally, I would plead for the EU to grant Georgia official candidate status, which is more a symbolic action than a pre-decision of membership. But symbols count, especially for Georgia’s long-thwarted pro-EU population.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IIP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 and then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.