The Tortuous Road to Peace in Ethiopia: A Humanitarian Ceasefire and Beyond
A political skirmish between the newly-minted Prosperity Party and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), coupled with other structural fault lines, led to the outbreak of a devastating civil war in the northern part of Ethiopia in November 2020. The war has given rise to one of the worst humanitarian crises the world has seen in recent history, in which tens of thousands of lives have been lost, many people have been displaced, and millions are facing a famine-like situation. Indeed, as Tomson Phiri of the World Food Program observed, around “9.4 million people [are] living their worst nightmare” as a direct consequence of the ongoing conflict and the situation in the northern part of Ethiopia is “a textbook humanitarian crisis.” There have also been allegations that food has been used as a weapon of war in Tigray. It should be noted that, as the war has expanded from Tigray to the neighboring Amhara and Afar regions since July 2021, the humanitarian crisis has worsened, with severe hunger tightening its grip throughout the northern part of the country.
Certainly, this man-made catastrophe could and should have been avoided had there been the political will from all warring parties. It has been appalling to helplessly witness how, more than 17 months into the civil war and despite an early and strong warning from UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres about the unfolding crisis, none of the parties showed a credible commitment to ameliorate the multifaceted humanitarian problems facing civilians.
Nevertheless, better late than never, as the adage goes: the government of Ethiopia recently declared an indefinite humanitarian truce whereby it pledged to “exert maximum effort to facilitate a free flow of emergency humanitarian aid into the Tigray region” in collaboration with humanitarian organizations and other partners. In the same statement, the government also called upon the Tigrayan insurgent group to reciprocate by withdrawing from the areas that they occupied in neighboring regions (Afar and Amhara), to which the TPLF immediately responded positively, albeit with some reservations. Among other comments, the TPLF stressed the need to show tangible results on the part of the government by delivering humanitarian assistance that is “commensurate with the needs on the ground” and the fact that “linking political and humanitarian issues are unacceptable.” Beyond making humanitarian assistance conditional, both parties have accused each other of obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
The Provision of Humanitarian Assistance is a Moral and Legal Obligation
For any functioning and responsible government, the highest moral order is to ensure the safety and security of its people to the fullest extent possible while also adhering to the established norms on the conduct of war in the context of armed conflicts. It would be categorically wrong to compare the responsibility of governments with the standards applicable to non-state actors, including belligerent groups. When it comes to guaranteeing freedom from want, it is incumbent upon governments to provide basic needs and humanitarian assistance. Under international law, states bear the primary responsibility to ensure the basic needs of their people. For instance, the UN Guiding Principles on Humanitarian Assistance provide that “the state has the primary role in the initiation, organization, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory.” By the same token, armed opposition groups, such as the TPLF, are not entirely absolved from moral and/or legal obligations; rather, as non-state actors, they have fewer responsibilities as compared to states.
Furthermore, within the realm of the extant legal norms regulating non-international armed conflicts (NIAC), each party to the conflict shall undertake a minimum obligation, according to Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions, Article 18(2) of the Additional Protocol II, Rule 55 of the ICRC, and customary practices. More specifically, according to a customary norm of international humanitarian law, under no circumstances shall a provision of necessities be obstructed by parties to the conflict and a deliberate “starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.” Moreover, the intentional deprivation of humanitarian aid, when carried out systematically, amounts to crimes against humanity under international criminal law.
Thus, seen in the light of the legal and/or moral obligations to provide humanitarian aid as well as the dire humanitarian situation on the ground, the declaration of a humanitarian truce by the Ethiopian government and the corresponding willingness to cooperate on the part of the TPLF is a step in the right direction.
However, a political declaration alone is not sufficient to alleviate the humanitarian crisis. For one thing, since the declaration of the truce, no significant progress has been made. Second, the large-scale humanitarian crisis calls for a massive and prompt mobilization of resources and effective coordination among all stakeholders. Third, unless the temporary truce is bolstered by a comprehensive ceasefire to end the humanitarian blockade as well as confidence-building measures, the delicate political situation is bound to cripple efforts to curb the looming famine and lay the foundation for a lasting peace.
That being the case, this unique opportunity should be seized upon to set a peace process in motion.
The Humanitarian Truce as a Window of Opportunity for Peace
As much as the lack of peace led to the worst humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia, the humanitarian truce may well be used to forge a path toward peace. A peace-making initiative is always a process and, at times, a complex endeavor, particularly in the context of deeply divided societies. This is precisely the case in Ethiopia given that factors such as the underlying political crisis, unbridled ethno-nationalism, ruptured social fabrics, competing claims over disputed territories between the Amhara and Tigray regions, and an extreme level of distrust among the various parties to the conflict contribute to the complexity of conflict resolution mechanisms.
Of course, this does not mean that hope for peace is unwarranted or that the conflict is impossible to resolve. The humanitarian truce has brought about a window of opportunity, with a wind of change beginning to blow, but everything hinges upon how effectively the stakeholders – including the parties to the conflict, the Ethiopian people, and the international community – are able harness it.
The starting point must be to make sure that the parties honor their word and humanitarian aid reaches those who desperately need it for their survival. After all, a humanitarian truce should not be attached to any condition whatsoever, for doing so defeats its very purpose. Put differently, humanitarian aid should be taken for what it is: as an end in itself. As a result, the added value of the humanitarian truce should be considered carefully. In this regard, there are two possibilities. If the humanitarian truce fails, it will lead to two undesirable repercussions: further fueling the conflict and derailing any hope for peace. On the other hand, the proper implementation of the humanitarian truce can be used as a confidence-building measure to facilitate a durable ceasefire, heal the wounds of war, and set favorable ground for an eventual peace agreement.
But for the truce to hold and unfettered humanitarian access to materialize as intended, external pressures are needed more than ever. To begin with, parties may simply violate the terms of the truce at any time given the absence of a binding agreement, and, most importantly, the federal government and TPLF leaders may be cynical about the rationale behind the humanitarian truce. The possibility of biding time for a new offensive is high. As evidence, the humanitarian crisis has been ongoing for a long time, but neither the government nor the TPLF have shown genuine concern for the people on whose behalf they have been brutally fighting. This shows that the humanitarian truce came not as a result of the moral conviction of the fighting parties as such, but mainly due to formidable external pressures.
These external forces come in two forms: the mutual exhaustion of the parties that led to the stalemate and concerted diplomatic pressure from the international community, notably including the threat of sanction from the US government through two major draft bills: H.R.6600 (Ethiopia Stabilization Peace Act of 2021) and S.3199 (Democracy Promotion Act of 2021). Moreover, the political situation on the domestic front is not favorable to continuing the war, demonstrated by deteriorating support for the government, a looming economic crisis, and the call for an inclusive national dialogue.
In sum, while the humanitarian truce is commendable for what it is and all relevant stakeholders should play their respective roles to alleviate the humanitarian catastrophe, this rare window of opportunity should be seized upon wholeheartedly to pave the way for peace. To this end, all parties should act with utmost care in order not to compromise the positive atmosphere, which includes avoiding warmongering rhetoric (especially by media outlets), reinvigorating the people-to-people approach to conflict management, making use of the transitional justice framework to accommodate the demand for peace and justice, and holding a genuine and inclusive national dialogue to bring about consensus and reconciliation. The road to peace in Ethiopia appears tortuous, as it has always been, but the possibility to make amends is out there and the time to act is now.
Moges Teshome joined the International Institute for Peace as a project assistant in April 2022. Mr. Teshome holds a Bachelor of Law from Addis Ababa University, LLM in International Criminal Justice and Human Rights from the University of Dundee and Master of Advanced International Studies from Vienna School of International Studies. Mr. Teshome’s research interests include conflict management and regional security, global human rights and advocacy, international criminal justice, the normative study of international relations, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology and sustainable development. Before joining the IIP, Mr. Teshome interned at Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-proliferation as well as served as a lecturer of law and associate dean at Haramaya University College of Law. At Haramaya University, he was responsible for teaching various legal courses, undertaking policy-oriented research and community services, notably coordination of free legal aid for the needy and marginalised section of the society.