There is much talk about strengthening European defense—especially considering Russian aggression against Ukraine and repeated violations of European airspace. In this context, Europe is discussing the expansion of its military capacity, the types of weapons it needs, and the pros and cons of cooperating with and depending on the U.S.. However, there is no genuine effort to argue with and persuade a sometimes-skeptical European public to gain broad support for increased military spending. It is not enough to have support only in countries traditionally willing to defend themselves against a possible Russian attack.
Reinforcing European defense will certainly require more financial resources than have been spent since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. One of the key questions is how this additional spending will be financed and what other public expenditures may have to be cut, even if loans cover additional defense spending. Also, the argument that military investment could create qualified jobs is unlikely to convince most European citizens to accept higher defense budgets. With an increasing number of voters supporting far-right—and in some cases far-left—parties, securing public support must be a top priority for democratic leaders at both national and European levels.
The Peace Dividend
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its European empire was seen as an opportunity to reduce "unnecessary and unproductive" defense spending. Europe aimed to make the most of the peace dividend, and it indeed did benefit from reduced military expenditure. But Europe did not anticipate a Russia that would increase its military capabilities while pursuing aggressive, interventionist policies toward its neighbors. Nor did it foresee a U.S. administration insisting that NATO partners take more responsibility for their own security, while simultaneously casting doubt on the alliance itself. Regardless, European NATO members will need to raise their defense spending as a percentage of GDP closer to U.S. levels. Europe now faces a genuine "Zeitenwende" (turning point).
The dramatic and unforeseen changes in Europe at the end of the 1990s did not lead to the "End of History," as predicted by Francis Fukuyama. For a very brief period, this hope prevailed, but soon it became an illusion. War returned to the heart of Europe. One can argue endlessly about how the West could have done more to integrate Russia into Western economic, political, and military structures, or how war could have been avoided. But regardless of such debates, the reality is that Putin's Russia did not respect the borders of neighboring countries—including those it had solemnly promised to respect. Often, it is overlooked how Putin reinstated authoritarian rule in Russia, closely linking it to his expansionist foreign policy. One can remain skeptical about whether Russia's integration into a “Common European House” could have been a realistic alternative to the cautious Western Russia policy.
European Wars and Russia
For centuries, Europe was synonymous with war. European empires often waged wars abroad, with colonization and the slave trade among the most brutal manifestations of imperialism. But European countries were also victims of wars, often originating in the East or the Mediterranean. Internally, Europe was torn apart by conflicts such as the Thirty Years' War and the First and Second World Wars.
We often forget that today's war in Ukraine is devastating a region historically affected by conflict, not least by expansionist Russia. As Oliver Jens Schmitt points out in his book Moskaus westliche Rivalen (Klett-Cotta, 2025), Russia's wars with its Western neighbors were not just about territory but about competing visions of governance. While Moscow promoted absolute monarchy, its opponents had systems where power was shared between monarchs and nobility. These were the first steps towards broader, democratic governance not visible in Moscow.
Recognizing Moscow's ongoing expansionist ambitions doesn't mean blaming Russia for all past European wars. But it does show that Russia has repeatedly used war to push westward. Even in cases where Russia did not start the war, it used the chances to expand. When Nazi Germany began its aggression against Poland, it was Russia that occupied, according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Eastern part of Poland. It consistently participated in dividing Poland and, during and after WWII, expanded its empire into the Baltics and asserted dominance over Eastern Europe, crushing resistance to its rule.
European Wars and the West
The big powers of the West were not innocent either. France and Britain led colonial empires, but Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, and later Italy were also part of the Western aggression and played major roles in imperial expansion. Even the U.S., often seen as an example of a Western power without colonies, was deeply connected to and benefited from colonialism. These powers portrayed themselves as bearers of enlightenment and Christianity, imposing their values while committing countless atrocities.
The fact is that it took decades for Europe to break free from colonial and neo-colonial mindsets. The trend toward decolonization became clear after the “Wind of Change”, mentioned by the British Prime Minister McMillan when he addressed the South African Parliament in 1960. Alongside this decolonization process, which was never fully accomplished, European unity began to form in what would become the European Union.
The development of that "union sui generis" progressed slowly and remains under threat from nationalist forces. Today's integration process faces pressure from an expansionist Russia, an ambitious China leveraging economic power, and a U.S. defending its global dominance, often with little regard for European interests.
Europe as a Peace Project
Despite its flaws, today's European peace project is a vast improvement over its violent past. While exploitation of poorer countries isn't over, the growing empowerment of countries of the global South and China is - even if slowly - changing the international balance of power. Europe itself is on the way to rebalance its global influence, even as the U.S., China, and Russia embrace hard-power tactics.
No other global region is as committed as the EU to responsible global development. This commitment stems not only from Europe's relative weakness but also from a belief in multilateralism and international cooperation. Yet, the EU must also recognize that global powers like the U.S., Russia, and China are reviving nationalism and geopolitical competition. Additionally, new technologies threaten to undermine democratic and social relations between people.
The EU must stand firm against powers that aim to revive narrow-minded and egoistic nationalism. It must defend itself—and Ukraine—against Russian aggression. It has to fight against the forces that deny global warming and want to rebuild an outdated fossil fuel economy. It has to fight for sound human relations in a world where Artificial Intelligence may soon outpace humanity's ability to control it. Above all, it must defend democracy against authoritarianism.
The European Union and its member states fight for personal freedoms, including freedom of expression, religion, and sexual orientation. Yes, even in Europe, individual liberties have limits, but these limits exist to protect the rights of all citizens, not to serve authoritarian control. Democratic societies must act when one person's freedom infringes on another's. Of course, there can and should be a debate over where that line is drawn, which is part of democracy; in authoritarian regimes, such debates are silenced or punished.
The Authoritarian Turn Backward
Indeed, the more individual rights are underlined and promoted, the more the common democratic cause can suffer. Narcissistic individualism that prioritizes personal freedoms above all else can harm the voluntary social cohesion that democracy needs. Extreme individualism makes society more vulnerable. This vulnerability is exploited by authoritarian regimes that promote traditional "values" to consolidate power and wealth—as we can see in Hungary under Orbán, the U.S. under Trump, Russia under Putin, and China under Xi.
Even within the EU, you find public authorities that grossly violate these very principles on which the European Union is built. These regimes are often ideologically aligned with Russia and aim to dismantle European values enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Their goal is to create a different Europe, one rooted in nationalism. This is a cultural war.
They exploit liberal-left "overreach" on issues like sexual rights or inclusive language to stoke public backlash. In response, they push rigid, authoritarian social rules and nationalist governance. This new nationalism threatens to divide Europe internally through contradictory views and interests, and to weaken it externally, leaving it at the mercy of global powers. Authoritarian European leaders would ultimately answer to stronger forces abroad who would exert economic and political control.
As Erica Frantz, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Joseph Wright recently wrote in The New York Times International Edition: “A new era of strongmen is upon us.” They underline what these strongmen/strongwomen mean for the growing number of European citizens who choose to vote for authoritarian leaders. “The consequences of strongman rule also seep into the fabric of economics and everyday life. Such leaders are more likely to attack independent domestic institutions like their central banks, as Mr. Trump is doing with the U.S. Federal Reserve, which threatens to stoke inflation and make it less predictable. Economic growth and equality often suffer under personalist autocracies, which tend to concentrate wealth among elites, suppress private investment that depends on consistent policies, and neglect essential public goods such as education, health care, and infrastructure….Strongmen often pad their pockets and those of their loyalists and undermine their own economies by shifting assets offshore….Repression also rises as authoritarians fabricate fears about „enemies within.”
Conclusions
The belief and hope that many voters have, when supporting extreme right-wing parties, that a more just society will be the result, has repeatedly been destroyed in the past. Authoritarian leaders focus on power and wealth and persecute “internal enemies” to try to divide societies into good and bad citizens. Those who believe that Europe's past of war, nationalism, and authoritarianism must stay behind us, and who support a democratic Europe of rights and multilateralism, face a monumental task ahead of them. This kind of Europe is under attack by old and new extremist forces. These forces offer a false promise of traditional stability, strict social norms, fixed identities, economic certainty, and no immigration. They deny that this would be a Europe that depends heavily on the political will, mood, and personal interests of the leaders of the US, China, and Russia, because it would be a divided Europe with often antagonistic interests.
It is necessary to make the choice between the two Europe’s clear: one that is divided, nationalist, and submissive; and one that is united, democratic, and values driven. The latter may be imperfect and vulnerable, but with strong political, economic, cultural, and military defense, it can uphold the ideals that emerged from Europe’s darkest times. Defending this Europe means defending a continent that, while flawed, can correct its mistakes and failures and is open to helpful criticism from within and outside.
But governments—and the European Union—must craft a sophisticated strategy to win the support of the younger generation for a stronger European defence policy. In their paper “The Next Generation Needs a New Social Contract for European Defence” (published by the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies), Agnieszka Homanska and Wojciech Przybylski highlight the need to address the concerns and interests of youth. “The ReArm initiative, an EU framework to enhance European military readiness and resilience, emphasizes fiscal priorities, often overlooking the societal trust needed to boost troop recruitment. However, effective national service can create a fair agreement, enabling young people to serve, gain skills, and thrive, with society providing robust support. The alienation felt by youth in the eastern-flank countries poses a risk of escalating crises that will likely lead to recruitment shortfalls, even in Poland.” What’s needed, they write, is a new social contract, “one that the new generation and those culturally and economically rooted in the twentieth century can all agree on, sign, and adhere to.” Designing and implementing such a contract is among the most urgent and most difficult tasks ahead for the European Union and its member states.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.