Published on Italianieuropei
Very few people desire a prolonged war between Ukraine and Russia – a war that risks ending in a nuclear disaster. But there are widely different opinions about how this war could be ended – not only between politicians and military experts but also between political scientists. The same is true of debates over why the war began and who started it. To talk of a possible and peaceful end to the war, we must first return to the beginning of the conflict. Although it may seem clear who started the war, there is an ongoing debate even in Western countries about where the “true” responsibility for the war lies.
A common imperial mindset
Despite’s Russia’s outright invasion of Ukraine, it is strange that one can still find prominent Western thinkers who chiefly discuss the mistakes and responsibilities of the West – especially of the US and NATO. For political scientists like John Mearsheimer and Jeffrey Sachs, the war is essentially a great power conflict and the US bears the primary responsibility. In a speech for the 2023 Allama Iqbal Lecture titled “The Geopolitics of Peace,” Sachs argued that “the Ukraine war is not mainly a war between Russia and Ukraine, despite what you read every day. It is primarily a war between Russia and the United States, and it needs to be understood in those terms.“ He added: “This is a provoked war because the United States acted in a way that Russian leaders understandably viewed as deeply threatening to Russia‘s security.”
Such Western thinkers, exemplified by Sachs, have a deep understanding for Russia’s imperial position but no understanding for the citizens of Ukraine or other countries who longed for NATO membership for their own security as they listened to statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin about how the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century. These authors have no consideration for the security concerns of Russia’s neighbors, nor do they consider what would have happened if NATO would not have expanded. Moreover, they neglect the fact that there is no proof that a neutral Ukraine would have had its borders respected by Putin, who has openly denied Ukraine the right to exist independently from Russia.
It is stranger still that some of these international relations scholars believe that it is the right of Russia alone to determine the security policy of its neighbors. For them, it is Russia, not Ukraine, that has the freedom to choose. This way of thinking, which holds the recognition of great power superiority at its center, must be dropped. It is time to recognize and accept that all countries have the right to choose their own defensive security strategies.
Furthermore, the aforementioned scholars do not reflect on the drastic deterioration of democracy in Russia since Putin came into power, as the country has grown increasingly dictatorial. Scholars such as Sachs and Mearsheimer show no consideration of the domestic situation in Russia, despite analysis by political scientist from Russia itself. Analysts such as Greg Yudin and Vladislav Inozemtsev chart the background and origin of Putin’s domestic and foreign strategy, showing that Russia is not just another big power; it has become a revisionist and revanchist state with a repressive regime.
The greatest obstacle to peace is the parallel development in Russia of a drastic decline in the rule of law domestically and the increasing imperialism of its foreign policy. Russia today seeks to regain at least part of its former imperial territory and extend its influence in its neighborhood through brutal force. Russia – or specifically Putin and his corrupt group of oligarchs – has no interest in modernization, yet an authoritarian and oligarchic country does not appeal to the citizens of its neighbors. To gain influence, Putin’s regime supported separatist movements and challenged the borders of neighboring states.
In this respect, there is more truth in the evaluation of experts such as Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, when he wrote: “This is not a war about NATO enlargement or a future expansion to include Ukraine (which was not to happen). It is not about NATO at all, or the United States, for that matter. This is a war initiated by Russia to eradicate Ukraine as a sovereign entity. Ukraine represented an alternative path for a Slavic nation – one characterized by a democratic political system and deep ties to the West. This was and is unacceptable to Putin, lest it stoke demands at home to shift Russia onto a similar path.“ I would not categorically exclude preventing NATO expansion from Putin’s list of motivations, but the primary cause for Russia’s war is certainly the threat posed by an independent and democratic Ukraine to Putin’s power and to his dreams of rebuilding a Russian empire. A democratic Ukraine and a NATO security umbrella for countries threatened by Putin is in direct opposition to such aspirations.
Western mistakes
My opposition to the naive position of Sachs and Mearsheimer does not imply that the West or the EU in particular should not have acted differently. Needless to say, power politics played an important role for the West as well – especially for the US – as it has often acted according to the principle of “winner takes all.” I have always argued that the EU should have offered more cooperation to Russia – and with less arrogance.
But there was little interest for such cooperation from Russia, which did not accept the “modernization partnership” offered by the EU. This lack of interest from the Russian side was met with skepticism, especially by some “new” EU member countries that, based on their past experiences, were happy to loosen their links with an imperial Russia. They did not want a newly influential Russia – especially a Russia that did not recognize its responsibility for its past oppression and violation of basic individual rights and state sovereignty.
The fact is that there were critical differences between the approaches of Russia and the EU. Putin was never interested in strengthening democratic processes – on the contrary. Neither economic modernization nor transparency were on his agenda. Nor did he respect the borders of some of his neighbors. In this regard, NATO expansion in the region was viewed negatively and as a threat to Russia. But Russia itself did not offer credible security arrangements for its neighbors; in the end, it even violated the Budapest Memorandum “guaranteeing” Ukraine’s borders.
Western reaction
As a result, the West reacted quickly to support Ukraine in defending itself against the Russian aggression, including through the delivery of arms. In particular, EU countries with a history of Russian imperialism pushed for a clear and determined answer by NATO and the EU. In fact, some countries hoped not only that the Russian aggression would be stopped and pushed back but aimed for a decisive Ukrainian victory, with Russia not only withdrawing from all Ukrainian territory but paying reparations. They even hope that a decisive military defeat might trigger regime change in Russia.
Germany was criticized for being too slow and delayed in its reaction, although Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke of a – subsequently well-known – “Zeitenwende.” For some time at least, the balance of power within the EU moved in the direction of the Baltic states and Poland, which have developed strong anti-Russian positions. Nevertheless, for the moment, the West remains united, which may prove helpful for securing peace. Russia should not be allowed to hope for or be encouraged by splits and divisions between the West, but Western unity alone will not lead to peace.
The primary obstacle to peace is unquestionably Russia’s determination to destroy an independent Ukraine. To prevent such a defeat, weapons for Ukraine are vital. The experience of the last year demonstrates that the West and the EU in particular need a more coherent defense – and military – strategy. But strengthening the EU’s military capacities must not lead to a militarization of the Union; it would be a grave mistake to weaponize the EU’s foreign and security policy.
The EU must – parallel to supporting Ukraine on all possible levels – look for a reasonable way out of the war. To that end, it must develop a global strategy that recognizes the changed balance of power. The West must recognize and accept that its dominance is fading and that countries outside the bipolar world order defined by the West – primarily by the US on one side and by Russia on the other side – have a say in the world’s future. In an article titled “The U.S. is not an indispensable peacemaker,” Trita Parsi wrote: “As the Ukraine crisis has shown, America has been immensely effective in mobilizing the West but hopelessly clueless in inspiring the global south.” The same holds true for the EU. The war in Ukraine could be a chance for a general rethink of the West’s attitude and approach to the “rest” of the world. Otherwise, it is the West that risks becoming the “rest.”
Mediation required
It is obvious that, in order to achieve peace, a mediator is required. Such a mediator or a group of mediators cannot come from within either of the two camps. Moreover, it is doubtful that China could play such a role given its close ties to Russia. China’s recent mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia should not be considered as an argument for such a role in the Ukraine war. At the same time, it would be unwise to push China into closer cooperation with Russia. Even if the balance of power has shifted away from Russia and toward China, the West should not support the development of a unified China-Russia bloc.
If China cannot serve as a mediator to the conflict, a country from the Global South could take on this role instead. A country such as Brazil, South Africa, or Turkey could play a decisive role. Independent from its own voting patterns in the UN, the prospective mediator should take past UN resolutions as the basis for a peace strategy. The mediator should then approach both sides to find the conditions for an armistice and, eventually, a peace agreement. The war in Ukraine could be the trigger for the UN and the Global South to save the world from a terrible war and the threat of nuclear Armageddon. This could and should be the hour of the UN’s General Assembly – as the Security Council remains blocked – and the Global South. In this regard, the UN Secretary General should play a more active role in exploring possible paths to peace.
We need peace as soon as possible, but we should be aware of the complicated starting points for such a peace. On one side there is an authoritarian Russia expounding a revanchist and violent ideology and a strong hatred for all the principles and values that the West represents. On the other side there is Ukraine with its astounding readiness to bear tremendous sacrifices and its widely-shared goal of ejecting all Russian forces from its territory. Both sides have developed a mutual animosity and even hatred of one another, which will be difficult to overcome. While the hate campaign was started by Russia, many Ukrainians have reacted to the Russian invasion with the outright rejection of Russian language and culture. Finally, there is a West that fully supports Ukraine militarily, politically, and economically – including with the promise future EU membership – with many hoping for a permanent weakening of Russia and/or a fundamental change in its imperial behavior.
Elements of peace
Contrary to those who see the necessity of a neutral buffer zone between Russia and the West, I would argue that any peace agreement must recognize an independent Ukraine that has not only the right to an independent existence but also the right to choose its own security umbrella. This basis is also important for other countries in Russia’s neighborhood. As a result, any agreement accepted by Ukraine as well as by Europe at large must include some sort of security guarantee for Ukraine. Any “solution” without such a guarantee would be seen as treasonous by Ukrainians and would prompt new threats. Such a security guarantee may be organized with Ukraine as member of NATO or outside NATO. Regardless, NATO is coming closer to Russia, especially with the imminent membership of Finland and – probably soon – Sweden. Contrary to ‘orthodox’ thinking, NATO membership for Ukraine could even be a security guarantee for Russia that there will be no “crazy” or irresponsible government in Kyiv trying to attack Russia in retaliation. Thus, Ukraine’s NATO membership could be a guarantee against a future Russian attack as well as a safeguard against retaliatory attacks by Ukraine. Needless to say, Russian leadership may view this differently.
On the other hand, a military presence from third countries organized by the UN General Assembly – ranging from the US to countries of the Global South – could also serve as a safeguard against a renewed attack from Russia or retaliation by Ukraine. In the short term, Russia cannot serve as a security guarantor after everything that has happened. In the long run, however, a Russia that has learned from its past crimes should be incorporated into a common security structure.
Concerning territory, it will be nearly impossible to reach a peace or even an armistice agreement with all territory going back to Ukraine. This is especially true for Crimea. The optimal solution would be to organize an internationally-observed or -organized referendum. But there would be many years of arguing about who is entitled to vote, with no agreement at the end. Too many people – especially ethnic Ukrainians – left Crimea and Donbas to return to the status quo ante before the war. The second best solution would be to establish open and transparent borders with the right to return by those who so desire. In all cases, an agreement would make it necessary to maintain impartial international troops on the borders. The UN and/or the OSCE should be involved in protecting the citizens of both countries and ensuring compliance with any agreement. These troops could also observe a demilitarized zone established after the armistice on either side of the border. In this respect, commanders from countries of the Global South could also play an important role.
In addition, it is of paramount importance to start new discussions on disarmament agreements. In this respect, it would be necessary to include initiatives from the Global South. These countries should insist on more money spent on economic and social development and on urgent climate policies – instead of a new arms race. Any agreement on Ukraine would require several agreements on internationally-observed and -controlled disarmament in Europe and beyond. New efforts for the production and distribution of weapons in the West must not deter universal disarmament. The war against Ukraine has already demonstrated that wars are unable to achieve their stated aims. Instead, they result in the massive loss of human life, destruction, and often self-destruction, and there is always the risk of nuclear disaster.
Peace without justice
Another central issue to be addressed concerns compensation for the colossal war damages in Ukraine. It will not be easy to reach an agreement with Russia over such compensation, and even the use of Russian money in Western banks would not be easy to organize. This is very often “stolen” money, but it is stolen from the Russian people and belongs to them. As a result, it will be very difficult to ensure that the compensation due to Ukraine is financed by Russia. In this sense, there is no chance for a just peace. However, it is worth recalling that the Treaty of Versailles was considered unjust and created the conditions for the Second World War, as John Maynard Keynes wrote in his famous book “The Economic Consequences of Peace.”
The same holds true for efforts to bring Putin and some of his high-ranking officers as well as the leaders of the Wagner Group before international courts. This would deliver justice and serve as a warning for future leaders who have similar crimes in mind, but it is no accident that Russia – as well as the US and China – does not recognize the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
Conclusion
We should be aware that any negotiations between representatives of Russia and Ukraine beyond agreements in areas such as grain exports will be exceedingly difficult. Both sides have promised their citizens total victory. Indeed, many in the West and especially in Ukraine have rejected any negotiations with the Putin regime. However, for the time being, there is no credible hope for regime change in Russia, and even regime change is no guarantee for a more acceptable or reasonable Russia. Irrespective of the Ukrainian resistance to enter into serious talks with Putin, the climate in Russia is and will probably remain toxic – even more so than during the Soviet Union. This, together with attitudes in Ukraine, will be one of the biggest obstacles to peace.
Whatever we can achieve as a solution and whenever we can achieve it, the world faces an extended period of a new cold war. Hopefully this will stay cold and will not result in any significant conflict between a Western bloc and a united China-Russia bloc. Moreover, the EU should not blindly follow the confrontational position of the US toward China. Instead, it must develop a more sophisticated global strategy and refrain from the weaponization of its global efforts. Either way, the EU must recognize that power has shifted toward the countries of the Global South, as can be seen with the many countries of the Global South not following the Western line at the UN. This multipolarity is entirely new and not yet understood in its structure or outlook.
Instead of futile attempts to convince some of the big powers of the Global South to condemn Russia, the West should encourage these countries to meditate in a way that would end the war and reestablish an independent and sovereign Ukraine – even with modified borders with Russia. These borders and the adjacent demilitarized zones should be guaranteed by international troops. At the same time, the sovereignty of Ukraine must include a free choice over its security umbrella. Parallel to “resolving” the war between Russia and Ukraine, efforts for European and universal disarmament must also begin anew. In this area too, the UN and the countries of the Global South must be invited to play an active role.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IIP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.