At the recent Budapest Balkan Forum organized by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Hungarian Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, I was asked to comment on the likelihood and prospects for the Western Balkan countries to join the EU in the wake of the “Ukraine war.” The war has unquestionably had an immense impact on the EU’s enlargement process, and the awarding of official candidate status to both Ukraine and Moldova represents a significant step forward.
Who is responsible for the war?
I am using the expression “Ukraine war” deliberately, as Hungarian officials and Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto in particular only referred to the conflict as the “Ukrainian war” or the “war in Ukraine.” It was never called what it is: a Russian war against Ukraine. This position was in marked contrast to statements by the foreign ministers of Albania and North Macedonia, for whom the party responsible for the war is clear. In addition, they argued that any initiative to bring the war to an end should not lose sight of which party is responsible for the killing and destruction in Ukraine. Conversely, Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic complained that the NATO bombing of Serbia was never condemned by the UN and rejected any lecturing about Serbia’s relations with Russia by countries who were once members of the Warsaw Pact, as Yugoslavia was the only county that criticized the Soviet intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Thus Dacic cannot be accused of being a fervent supporter of Russia.
In addition to advocating for Hungary’s “neutral” position concerning the war, Szijjarto also had clear advice on bringing the Western Balkan countries into the EU. For him, the enlargement process is simply a political decision and not a technical one. It is notable that his approach does not consider the importance of reforms to implement EU values and principles or strengthen democratic institutions as criteria for EU accession. In addition, Szijjarto argued that the strength of the EU depends primarily on the number of member countries and any new member would automatically add to the EU’s power.
Russia’s aggression endangers the international order
Given that the war was started by Russia, I would argue that a country’s position on Russia’s responsibility is a crucial factor in evaluating that country’s readiness to join the EU. The war has already changed the EU and will continue to do so in the future. Moreover, for a large majority of EU governments, political neutrality in regards to a war deliberately started by Russia is not an acceptable policy. The idea of a united Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok is, unfortunately, dead. Whatever the reasons for the death of that dream, the mortal blow was delivered by Vladimir Putin with Russia’s attack on Ukraine. It was also intended – as Putin himself underlined – as an attack on Western values and on European borders based on the free will of peoples. To avert such an attack, the EU must stick together in defending Ukraine.
The defense of Ukraine as well as the EU is not possible without the support of the US. Russia’s attack on Ukraine made that clearly visible and brought the EU closer to both the US and NATO. It would – or will – take a long time for the EU to reach its much-discussed goal of “strategic autonomy.” Of course, improved coordination and cooperation within NATO and between NATO and EU defense policies – including on arms procurement – would reduce costs and increase the efficiency of defense efforts by EU countries.
New challenges for EU security policy
Even before the war, the EU sought to encourage candidate countries to align their strategic aims with its own. With the exception of Serbia – and partly Bosnia and Herzegovina – the Western Balkan countries are in line with EU foreign and security policy, especially concerning the Russian war against Ukraine. Serbia, too, often follows the political line taken by the EU, and it also conducts regular maneuvers with NATO – more than it does with Russia. But the Serbian leadership has pursued an opportunistic and ambiguous role for domestic reasons. After having nurtured anti-Western and pro-Russian sentiments, it is not easy to promote a clear pro-Western policy.
The EU, which was built after the devastation and horrors of World War II, is and must remain a peace project. The builders of that union thought that the economic basis of the EU and its relations with other countries – especially Russia – would be a major force for peace and stabilization in Europe. Where necessary, a small number of NATO troops would be able to support efforts to reach and maintain stability, as in the Western Balkans. Russia’s attack on Ukraine changed our fundamental beliefs about how to promote peace in Europe, as it became necessary to deliver weapons to Ukraine in order to defend itself.
New challenges for EU enlargement policy
In addition to weapons, Ukraine also received official EU candidate status. The fast track for Ukraine (and Moldova) was and is seen with great and understandable reservations by the countries of the Western Balkans. They have not been the beneficiaries of such quick – or one could say, hasty – decisions and feel discriminated against – and rightly so. Russian, Chinese, and Turkish influences in the region would be much weaker today had the EU – or some member countries – developed a more strategic and forward-looking enlargement policy. But past mistakes and failures cannot only be found on the side of the EU.
Enthusiasm for necessary reforms in the Western Balkans has been decreasing for some years. That is partly due to the EU’s enlargement fatigue, especially following the anti-enlargement stance of some domestic politicians. But the missing readiness of many EU countries is not the only reason and is certainly no justification for the lack of reforms in the region. The fact that these reforms would also strengthen the Western Balkan countries themselves in order to develop economically and encourage young people to stay is often overlooked. In addition, attitudes such as that of Szijjarto, who “forgets” to mention any conditions for joining the EU, are not helpful in propelling the region’s economic and political transition.
The EU must not discriminate against the Western Balkans
With all due respect to the political and moral support offered for Ukraine, the EU should not spread the fantasy that a quick accession is possible or that Ukraine’s accession could overtake or surpass that of the Western Balkan countries. The conditions for membership must be transparent and valid for all countries. However, there are already some benefits for Ukraine that are not offered to the Western Balkan countries. It would be very helpful if these countries would see the benefits of support for Ukraine for themselves, but all benefits and advantages granted to Ukraine should also be offered to the Western Balkan countries.
June of this year will mark 20 years since the Thessaloniki Summit, when the EU offered the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania a membership perspective. Only Slovenia and later Croatia have succeeded in passing the entrance test. I was a supporter of Croatia’s accession in my function as rapporteur of the European Parliament, which must agree on the accession of each new EU member. In the case of Croatia, there was still – despite growing enlargement skepticism – a readiness to accept new members. But one should not forget that Croatia also had a strong willingness to implement the necessary reforms, which proved decisive.
Of course, not everything was or is perfect. No EU country is in full accordance with the EU’s founding principles and values as expressed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. That is also true for Croatia, where nationalist rhetoric is once again souring public debate as well as relations with neighbors – especially Serbia. But much can be learned from Croatia’s accession process by the other countries of the Western Balkans, even if today’s situation is not very conducive to enlargement.
The EU must take decisive steps now!
The EU must also continue to pay special attention to the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia. After the name dispute between North Macedonia and Greece was resolved – by adding “North” to the country’s name – Bulgaria intervened and vetoed the opening of accession talks by demanding the explicit inclusion of a Bulgarian minority in the Macedonian constitution and the clarification of “identity” issues going back far into history. A French “compromise” supported by the EU led to an agreement between the two governments.
However, the Macedonian parliament still lacks a majority in favor of the constitutional amendments. In the meantime, extremist forces within both countries seek to exploit the dispute and poison bilateral relations. But the global security situation is far too precarious to let such conflicts spiral. From the conflict-ridden situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina to the unresolved issues between Serbia and Kosovo, there are too many open questions in the region to allow yet another bilateral dispute block the region’s way forward. Both the Western Balkans and the EU need a win in the form of opening and constructively pursuing new accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia. Such talks will not lead directly or immediately to membership, but they at least provide a basis for hope that the path is open and growing closer.
Parallel to these negotiations and to talks on settling the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU must develop specific plans for a staged or step-by-step integration of the Western Balkans into the EU. This could also be a model for Ukraine and Moldova and even Georgia, if the government in Tbilisi is able to free itself from the domination of former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili. Proposals for such an integration process have been elaborated by several research institutes and are being actively discussed. Russia’s war against Ukraine as well as the EU’s values of cooperation and democratic decision-making should push the EU not only to support Ukraine but also to elaborate a clear enlargement strategy for the Western Balkans. The EU should not miss the chance offered by Russia’s aggression, and it should act now to ensure the future stability of the Western Balkans.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IIP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.