Written for Forum United Europe
Elections to the State Duma – the lower chamber of the Russian parliament – will take place on 17-19 September. There are few intrigues about the winner and the overall composition of the parliament that will essentially stay the same in the next convocation. The preparation and process of election is indicative of the longer trend in Russian politics characterized by erosion of political competition and civil liberties, insulation of the political elites, and further consolidation of the corporatist state.
Context
Duma elections are taking place in yet a new political context than the previous ones in 2016. First, a referendum on constitutional changes carried out last July dashed the hopes about a near power transition from Putin to a selected successor. While such a transition is inevitable, it might happen much later than had been previously anticipated. The constitutional amendments ‘zeroed’ Vladimir Putin’s four terms in the office, allowing him to run for president again in 2024 and potentially stay in power until as late as 2036. Even though it is not yet clear whether he indeed will use this option, observers point to the long-term ‘conservation’ of the system that resists any attempts to profound changes[1].
Secondly, the stagnating system has been losing support among the citizens. The highly unpopular pension reform carried out in 2018, lack of new faces and forward-looking ideas among politicians, as well as the poor handling of the pandemic by the government have all contributed to the drop in the legitimacy of state institutions. Thus, the approval rating of the State Duma stood at 40% in July, with 56% of respondents disapproving of its work[2]. The President’s rating also experienced a drop in the past three years, from 82% in April 2018 to around 60% in the past months[3]. Therefore, the victory of the Kremlin-supported party - United Russia - in this election is perceived by the ruling elites as a chance to legitimize the existing system.
Finally, in the past two years and especially since January 2021 Russia has experienced a dramatic increase in civic activity and the suppression thereof by the state. Demonstrations against the arrest of the opposition politician Alexey Navalny took place across the country, with rallies ranging from hundreds to tens of thousands happening in bigger cities and small towns. Despite the impressive scale - the last comparable protest in Russia happened ten years ago - it was unable to mobilize broader layers of the society. Navalny is mainly supported by the educated, urban and young. As little as 22% of Russians expressed positive attitude towards the protest against Navalny’s arrest at its the peak in January[4]. A horizontal protest without a clear leader or label seems to resonate with a broader spectrum of the society[5]. For example, last year’s demonstrations in the regional city of Khabarovsk against the arrest of the region’s governor were better received by Russians, with 47% of respondents assessing them positively[6].
While the protests in Khabarovsk or against Navalny’s arrest were not sufficient in scale to endanger the existing political regime, they were taking place against the background of the mass rallies and unfolding political crisis in Belarus. Demonstrators in Belarus and Russia expressed solidarity with each other which might have alarmed the elites in Russia who fear a ‘color revolution’ happening in the country. Preparing for ‘conservation’, the regime ‘preventatively’ suppressed the rallies with unnecessary brutality and mass arrests. Prosecution of Navalny has a rather didactic purpose in this sense: the state is being demonstratively harsh on him in order to discourage any further dissent[7].
Repressions against civil society and political opposition have continued even after the protests ended. Most notably, they included broadening of the scope of the infamous foreign agent law. A non-profit organization, a medium and, since December 2020, even a private person can be declared foreign agent if they receive any foreign funding[8]. In the past months a number of independent media were pronounced ‘foreign agents’ which led to the loss of their revenues from advertising and even closure for some. A non-profit organization ‘Open Russia’ that is supported by the exiled oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky announced its liquidation due to restrictions on its activities under another law on ‘undesirable organizations’. Organizations connected to Navalny were declared extremist and anyone affiliated with them is not allowed to run in elections.
Election procedure and the likely outcome
With the conditions for operation of civil society greatly constrained, the election in September is expected to go ‘smoothly’, even though the state propaganda has warned before ‘illegal mass rallies organized by the West’ in the aftermath of elections[9]. While transparency of the voting procedure raises many concerns about possible manipulation of the results, the outcome expected by the ruling elites is primarily secured at the pre-election stage: candidates critical of the system are often not registered to run. This tactic has been used in previous election cycles, for example on the gubernatorial level. It has been adopted after 2011 Duma elections when apparent falsifications of the vote caused mass protests[10].
The Russian Duma has 450 seats. Its members (deputies) are elected for a five-year term through a mixed voting system. Half of the seats (225) are filled through party lists by proportional representation with a 5% electoral threshold. The other half of the deputies are elected by majority voting in 225 single-mandate constituencies that the Russian territory is split into, including Crimea.
Out of 32 parties registered in Russia, 14 will compete in this Duma elections through party lists. None of them represents a real challenge to United Russia. The composition of the next Duma is likely to stay very similar to the current one, with United Russia holding majority of the seats (the only intrigue here is whether it will have enough seats for a constitutional majority - 300). The opposition will include the Communist party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and A Just Russia - coalition of three parties with leftist-nationalist ideology. Other parties registered for the elections are unlikely to overcome the 5% threshold. Exceptions might be two new parties – ‘New People’ and the ‘Russian party of pensioners for social justice’ – whose very names point at their function, namely, to mitigate the sources of citizens’ dissatisfaction with politicians today.
Opposition parties in the Duma do not represent a genuine challenge to United Russia. They are part of the state machine, and are often referred to as systemic opposition. Surprisingly, many Russians view the role of the opposition in the parliament exactly in this light. The purpose of the opposition is seen as to check on the ruling party, safeguard it from mistakes, rather than to strive to come to power itself[11]. Non-systemic opposition that is critical of the political system as such and aims to change it is excluded from party politics. For example, Alexey Navalny’s repeated attempts starting from 2012 to register a party have all been rejected. In this situation the only option for a non-systemic candidate to get into the parliament is by running in single-mandate constituencies. According to one analysis, this year real competition in single-mandate constituencies will happen in 29 (out of 225) constituencies where the candidates from United Russia can lose to opposition candidates[12].
Non-systemic opposition candidates are faced with further obstacles. Most prominent ones can be denied registration or their possibilities to run an effective electoral campaign are restricted. For example, Lyubov Sobol who previously worked for Navalny’s Anti-corruption Fund had to withdraw her candidacy from the elections. She was put under house arrest in the aftermath of January protests and therefore could not effectively take part in the campaigning[13].
Securing the ‘necessary’ outcome
Apart from minimal chances of non-systemic opposition to campaign and be elected, further amendments to election and observation procedures will make the process even less transparent. First, election observation has been restricted to ‘representatives of electoral contestants, media and observers appointed by civic chambers’[14] (the latter ones are thought to be loyal to the authorities). Other citizens will not be allowed as observers. In addition, access to camera recordings from electoral stations that were available to public before will now be permitted only to members of electoral commissions, candidates and political parties[15].
No OSCE election observation mission will be deployed for the first time in nearly three decades to Russia. The mission was cancelled due to the Russian government’s restrictions on the number of observers allowed – the epidemiological situation was cited as a reason for the limitations. The OSCE found that the restrictions made cancellation of the whole mission ‘unavoidable’[16]. The pandemic also served as a reason to extend the election process. It will happen in three days instead of one, raising concerns that this could enable falsifications of the votes[17].
Another innovation at the Duma elections is electronic, or internet, voting that will be possible in seven regions, including Moscow. Experts have warned that the suggested procedure of vote counting is not transparent[18]. Authorities incentivize citizens to take part in online voting. For example, in Moscow, one can participate in a lottery to win a car or a flat if one votes electronically[19].
Any chance for the non-systemic opposition?
There are not too many entry points in the parliament for non-systemic opposition. Some argue that in this situation, protest has become virtually the only way of representation for the people that are critical of the system[20]. A strategy that non-systemic opposition promotes at this elections is so-called ‘smart voting’. In single-mandate constituencies voters are offered to cast their ballot for the strongest alternative candidate that is not associated – explicitly or covertly – with United Russia. This strategy proved successful in the 2019 Moscow municipal elections where the city parliament has now the largest number of opposition deputies in the country. However, a potential free rider of this system is the Communist party that does not actively support ‘smart voting’ but whose candidates often appear to be the strongest non-United Russia candidates in a given constituency[21].
Conclusions
To sum up, no surprises should be expected at the Russian parliamentary elections in September. The next convocation of the State Duma will consist of loyal to the system deputies that will unquestionably pass the laws decided upon in the Kremlin. They will also sustain considerable degree of animosity towards the West, criticizing the EU, USA, Ukraine and others in double standards and hostility towards Russia. For these purposes, hosts of political talk-shows from state channels and former employees of state media will become deputies. Among them is also Alexander Borodai – the former leader of self-proclaimed Donetsk republic. Finally, ambitious young technocrats will also enter the parliament through party lists of United Russia. This will be their first preparatory experience before future career in the state apparatus[22].
While it is common to characterize the political system in Russia as an authoritarian regime, the definition of corporatist state might be more suitable. In this respect, the parliament has a rather technical function of approving the necessary laws decided upon in the Kremlin. The head of state deals with the strategic issues that are of interest to him, leaving the rest to the managers. As the ‘Direct line’ with Putin has demonstrated, he has grown increasingly disinterested in the domestic affairs, preferring to deal with geopolitics and delegate social issues to technocrats[23].
In the corporatist state any criticism of the system as such is perceived as illegitimate. The term democracy might have acquired a skewed meaning in Russia and is often met with skepticism, as it was broadly used by very different types of leaders (Gorbachev’s ‘democratization’ and Putin’s ‘managed democracy’)[24]. In this situation, the stability of the current system is not at all paradoxical. Many Russians do support it, as Putin’s approval ratings demonstrate. Unlike the non-systemic opposition, the regime is more receptive to wishes of an average citizen who is not any longer surprised with pervasive corruption in the country but considers it, if not normal then at least unavoidable. Drawing on a seminal work of Spanish philosopher Ortega-y-Gasset’s ‘Revolt of the masses’, one Russian political scientist noted: ‘The secret of Putin’s ‘irremovability’ lies in the fact that his regime is in no way “foreign” to Russian masses. The key to his unique stability lies in the careful conformity to the moods of the masses’[25].
[1] Tatiana Stanovaya (9 June 2021). “Purges and Professionals: the Transformed Russian Regime”. Carnegie Moscow Center. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/84713
[2] “Trust to politicians, approval of institutions, and state of affairs in the country” (Doveriye politikam, odobrenye institutov i polozheniye del v strane; 30.07.2021) Survey. https://www.levada.ru/2021/07/30/doverie-politikam-odobrenie-institutov-i-polozhenie-del-v-strane-4/
[3] Andrei Kolesnikov and Boris Makarenko (31 May 2021). «Дума-2021: четыре интриги выборов» (Duma-2021: Chetyre intrigi vyborov). Carnegie Moscow Center. https://carnegie.ru/2021/05/31/ru-pub-84618
[4] ‘January protests’ (‘Yanvarskiye protesty’; 10 February 2021). Survey. https://www.levada.ru/2021/02/10/yanvarskie-protesty/
[5] Ekaterina Shulman during an online panel discussion ‘The Long Crackdown: Russian Society After the Navalny Protests’ (28 April 2021). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/28/long-crackdown-russian-society-after-navalny-protests-event-7623
[6] ‘January protests’ (‘Yanvarskiye protesty’; 10 February 2021). Survey. https://www.levada.ru/2021/02/10/yanvarskie-protesty/
[7] Andrei Kolesnikov during an online panel discussion ‘The Long Crackdown: Russian Society After the Navalny Protests’ (28 April 2021). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/28/long-crackdown-russian-society-after-navalny-protests-event-7623
[8] Entities with the foreign agent status must put the respective designation on all materials and content that they produce. They also face more frequent inspections by the authorities. The very term ‘foreign agent’ has a negative connotation in the Russian language and is associated with the Soviet-era term for spies.
[9] https://lenta.ru/news/2021/08/11/protesty/
[10] Cameron Ross. ‘Regional elections in Russia: instruments of authoritarian legitimacy or instability?’, June 2018. DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0137-1
[11] Andrei Kolesnikov and Boris Makarenko (31 May 2021). «Дума-2021: четыре интриги выборов» (Duma-2021: Chetyre intrigi vyborov). Carnegie Moscow Center. https://carnegie.ru/2021/05/31/ru-pub-84618
[12] Alexandr Kynev. ‘Waiting for a discord. A report on election monitoring on 19.9.2021.’ (V ozhidanii dissonansa. Analiticheskyi doklad po monitoring vyborov 19.9.2021). Liberal Mission Fund. https://liberal.ru/reports/v-ozhidanii-dissonansa
[13] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-58089263
[14] ‘Russian Federation State Duma Elections 19 September 2021. ODIHR Needs Assessment report 31 May-4 June 2021.’ https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia/491066
[15] https://www.dw.com/ru/transljaciju-s-uchastkov-na-vyborah-v-gosdumu-pokazhut-ne-vsem/a-58269802
[16] https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia/494488
[17] ‘Russian Federation State Duma Elections 19 September 2021. ODIHR Needs Assessment report 31 May-4 June 2021.’ https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia/491066
[18] https://www.forbes.ru/tehnologii/430931-melkim-kriptoshriftom-chto-ne-tak-s-elektronnym-golosovaniem-na-vyborah-v-gosdumu
[19] https://meduza.io/news/2021/08/12/v-moskve-sredi-uchastnikov-elektronnogo-golosovaniya-na-vyborah-poobeschali-razygrat-20-kvartir-i-100-avtomobiley
[20] Andrei Kolesnikov and Boris Makarenko (31 May 2021). «Дума-2021: четыре интриги выборов» (Duma-2021: Chetyre intrigi vyborov). Carnegie Moscow Center. https://carnegie.ru/2021/05/31/ru-pub-84618
[21] Andrei Kolesnikov and Boris Makarenko (31 May 2021). «Дума-2021: четыре интриги выборов» (Duma-2021: Chetyre intrigi vyborov). Carnegie Moscow Center. https://carnegie.ru/2021/05/31/ru-pub-84618
[22] Andrei Pertsev (9 July 2021). ‘Talk-show with elements of bureaucracy. What will the new composition of the State Duma’ (‘Talk show s elementami byurokratii: Kakim budet personalnyi sostav novoi Dumy’). Carnegie Moscow Center. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/84930
[23] Tatiana Stanovaya (1 July 2021). “Delegate: The ‘Direct line’ turned the president into a spectator” (‘Pereporuchai I delegirui. Kak primaya liniya prevratila presidenta v storonnego nablyudatelya’). Carnegie Moscow Center. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/84882
[24] Emily Look. (2020). How Do Post-Soviet Citizens View Democracy? Democratic Knowledge and Support in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, Russian Politics, 5(4), 401-425. doi: https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00504002
[25] Vladimir Pastukhov (7 August 2021). ‘A spoiler about Russia’s future’ (Spoiler Rossii budushchego). https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/08/07/vladimir-pastukhov-spoiler-rossii-budushchego
Background picture: duma.gov.ru
Marylia Hushcha is a Research Assistant at the International Institute for Peace in Vienna and is a board member of Think Tank Ponto. She previously worked at Pontis Foundation in Slovakia, where she managed a capacity-building project for NGOs in Russia. Marylia has completed training and fellowship programmes at the United Nations Office in Belarus, the European Academy of Diplomacy in Warsaw, and the University of San Diego. She holds a Master’s degree in European Studies from Comenius University in Bratislava.