Few days after having visited Bosnia - Herzegovina (see also: „Will there be war again?“), I had the opportunity to join a delegation of the European Council for Foreign Relations ( ECFR ) to Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. We could listen to many different voices, often contradictory towards each other. Political representatives expressed opposing opinions and civil society representatives were unhappy about the lack of progress in building open societies and about politicians, who failed to address the most important grievances of the population in their country and the region overall. The beautiful landscape which presented itself in the autumn sun did not reflect the broken societies. Or as one of our interlocutors expressed it: „the situation is calm but fragile“. The following résumé is my own and cannot be attached to any participant of this extremely well-organized visit by ECFR members.
KOSOVO
After the Declaration of Independence many countries in Europe and around the globe recognized its independence. Nevertheless, Kosovo could not move forward internationally. Unfortunately, also internally, there is little progress in constructing a united Kosovo, some see even steps backwards. But walking through the streets of Pristina, change is visible, and investments did take place. It is different in the north of the country, although also crossing the river Ibar today is different from my last visits several years ago.
Nevertheless, the discussions with the representatives of the Serb List (Srpska Lista) in northern Mitrovica were disappointing. Those hardliners showed a lack of engagement for a common Kosovo. The main emphasis of their argument lay in the ongoing discrimination of the Serb population by the Kosovo Albanians. They did not show any feeling of guilt concerning the recent past. They reiterated the demand to implement an agreement to create an “Association of Serb Communities”. Problematic seems especially their insistence on autonomy in education. To teach Serb history and only Serb history(!) would enhance the split into separate societies. But one must mention, that representatives of the former ruling party PDK are still supporting the establishment of such an association.
As I argued in an interview in the Kosovo television magazine INTERAKTIV, Albanians should also learn Serb history and Serbs should learn about Albanian history in order to understand the background and motivation of the “other” side, especially as they have to live together in one country. I do not doubt, that some of the discriminations of Serbs mentioned by our interlocutors in Mitrovica do continue, but after all what happened - and what I could see personally when I visited Kosovo the first time - one could also expect some steps from the Serb side to heal the wounds from the past.
Additionally, the Serb civil society organizations were unhappy with their role squeezed between the Serb nationalists and the Kosovo Albanians. They are perceived as traitors of the Serb cause and are seldomly consulted in trying to overcome the gap between Albanians and Serbs. In discussions I could have on the fringe of our common visit, this picture was confirmed. Also, in civil society and media, I felt a lack of readiness to jump over the dividing line between north and south the river Ibar and between Serbs and Albanians.
A political highlight of our visit was certainly the extensive talk with Prime minister Albin Kurti. He is probably one of the most intellectual head of governments in Europe. His analysis of the authoritarian tendencies in the Balkans and in Europe generally was excellent. But it seems that he is not yet sure, what way to go with Serbia and how to bridge the internal gap between Albanians and Serbs. But to move things forward and to strengthen the international situation of Kosovo, it would be necessary to have a convincing strategy for the talks with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and with Serbs inside Kosovo. However, it needs two to dance a tango and it is unclear what the Serbian president is intending. In addition, the recently announced elections in April in Serbia and Belgrade will certainly be detrimental to progress in the Serb-Kosovo talks.
The emotional highlight was the meeting with the Vice President of the Kosovo Parliament, Saranda Bogujevci. She was seriously wounded at the age of thirteen and lost most of her family in a massacre. But she is not led by hatred, but is actively fighting for human rights, the rights of refugees and the women cause. Despite her tragic personal experience, she is working for reconciliation. One special case which is important for reconciliation is the issue of missing persons. As Saranda Bogujevci said, even if there are more Albanians who are missing, you have also missing persons on the Serb side. You must care for all families who are suffering because of missing family members. One only can hope that her example will find followers in due time.
What will be the future of Kosovo? When I asked the Serb Orthodox Patriarch in Belgrade, Porfirije, about the situation in Kosovo, he underlined the spiritual origin not only of the Orthodox church but also of Serbia as such in Kosovo. These historic roots can never be neglected - which is unfortunately often done by the Albanians. But rationally it is difficult to imagine a return of Kosovo to Serbia. Maybe, so I would conclude, one should combine the emotional and rational approach and give Serbia the chance to strengthen their relations with all Serbs in Kosovo, not only with those in the north. But in return they would have to recognize the independence of Kosovo and build new bridges for the Albanians in Kosovo. And finally, together they could go the difficult and thorny way towards joining the EU. This will demand many transitional steps in between and a readiness for regional cooperation in connection with a „staged“ integration process to the EU.
MONTENEGRO
After our talks in Pristina we undertook a five-hour drive to Podgorica via Albania. A good part of it we could use a highway financed by the EU. Maybe the infrastructure construction is the most successful element of the EU support for the region - even if Montenegro was asking the Chinese to build their highway, with extremely high costs and many delays in finishing the first part of it.
The first discussion we had in Podgorica was with the long time President and Prime minister, Milo Đukanović. Đukanović had developed a clever strategy by seceding Montenegro from Serbia. Although Montenegrin military took part in the Yugoslav war on Milosević’s side, this strategy of separation gave him the chance to get recognition and support by the West. Many also say, that this policy and the decision to bring the country into NATO, had also the purpose to protect a corrupt and authoritarian system, which he established in Montenegro. Now he warns the West of the rising influence of Russia and again he is hoping for blind support by the West. Russian influence is particularly spread by support of the Democratic Front, a Party opposing the DPS (Democratic Party of Socialists) of Milo Đukanović or indirectly via Serbia. Serbian media moguls close to President Vučić, are investing enormously in the Montenegrin media sector.
Additionally, the Serb Orthodox Church is - according to President Đukanović and other critics - actively supporting the Serb influence and undermining the unity of the country. The recent incidents at the inauguration ceremony of the Serb Orthodox Metropolit in the old capital Cetinje, showed the split even inside the Orthodox community. In how far, a new generation of DPS forces, like the mayor of Podgorica, would draw a line between the traditional authoritarian policies of President Đukanović cannot be said. It would be beneficial for the country if all forces would be united in the fight against corruption and for transparency. For the time being the president of the country, who is also still the president of the party DPS is the overriding figure. And it is doubtful if he would be ready to actively support an anti-corruption strategy.
In the meantime the DPS is in opposition to a difficult and fragile coalition of parties from the green - liberal party to the nationalist Serb party of the Democratic Front. They are trying to represent the “other” side of the country. It has the aim to combat corruption but is now stuck in a deadlock as the main party of the new majority is boycotting the parliamentary work. It is rather unique, that a part of the majority is boycotting the parliamentary work and prevents the government to do its job. Our meeting with Dritan Abazović, the Deputy prime minister, who is coming from the NGO sector and is President of URA, the party he is co-founder of, demonstrated this strange situation. These days a way out of the deadlock is sought, but it will not be easy to find a coalition which is combining elements of the two opposing groups. It would have to fight corruption and the state-capture promoted or at least accepted by DPS. On the other hand, it would have to enhance a western foreign policy promoted by DPS. It would have to reject the growing influence of Serbia and Russia, a tendency which is promoted by the Democratic Front.
That it would be difficult to unite the political forces with their antagonistic attitudes, we could also feel at the meeting with the representatives of the civil society. They criticized the state-capture of the old powers, which have been dominant in the last thirty years. But they feared a mere exchange of prosecutors and judges by the “new” political actors without a radical change in the structure and behavior of the relevant institutions. Additionally, they criticized the inactivity of many government institutions and the parliamentary boycott. They asked for stronger engagement of the EU and hoped - as already expressed in Kosovo and even more so later in Serbia - that the new nominations of the Biden administration will bring new dynamics into the fight against corruption and for democratic development. Furthermore, it should also create the basis for a stronger cooperation between the US and the EU. For many critics only such a close cooperation could push the forces of state capture to accept reforms and new initiatives for building resilient institutions.
SERBIA
Our delegation did not meet President Vučić, nevertheless he was present in all our discussions we had with representatives of the civil society or of new political movements like Ne Davimo Belgrade. That the Serb President is a dominating political figure is not a threat as such. But all our interlocutors criticized the overall state-capture organized by President Vučić. Hereby the ownership of the majority of traditional media outlets, especially of television, and a well-organized message control plays an important role. But as we could experience in all the countries we visited, Vučić`s role is not limited to Serbia. He is controlling or at least strongly influencing also Serb politics and politicians in Kosovo and Montenegro. Additionally, he has a strong influence on Serbs in the Republika Srpska, even if the Serb leader in Bosnia- Hercegovina, Milorad Dodik has his own interests and intentions.
Some argue, that as the strategy of maintaining or regaining Greater Serbia via military intervention failed, a more sophisticated strategy is at work. Via media and via the Serb Orthodox church the Serbian influence should be strengthened. Meeting the Patriarch in Belgrade showed some hesitation from the Patriarch ‘s side. But he is not the whole church. Anyway, the media are the strongest instrument of President Vučić to influence Serbs neighbors - together with the support of Serb nationalist parties.
As most of the opposition parties boycotted the last elections in Serbia - due to the lack of respect of their work in the Parliament by the majority - the present parliament is just rubber stamping the government decisions. But just at the morning of our meetings with civil society representatives and an activist of the new political movement Ne Davimo in Belgrade, it was announced that at the beginning of April 2022 elections would be held for the position of president, for the Parliament and for the Belgrade assembly.
One can only guess about the motivation of President Vučić to call for these comprehensive elections. Maybe he recognized that a Parliament without opposition is not a good signal to the West and especially to the new Biden administration, which is very critical towards the corrupt structures in the Western Balkans. And as he expects anyway a strong support for him as President, he can be sure to have a new Parliament with a strong majority for him, if it is elected on the same day as he is reelected as president. And the same is true for Belgrade.
Whatever Vučić `s motivation is, it is an opportunity for the opposition to unite all the “progressive” forces and to hide all personal aspirations behind a strong common approach. Democracy needs active opposition forces and as for the time being, President Vučić is widely dominating the political scene in Serbia and even beyond. A rally of progressive forces - different from the ruling Progressive Party - is necessary not only for Serbia but also for the region and Europe as a whole. It is the Serb people who must decide whom they want to lead the country, but they must have a choice and full transparency about the ways the country can go.
CONCLUSIONS FOR THE EU
Much is at stake in the Balkans. Some of the trends one can see clearly in the countries of the Western Balkans, are reflecting trends we can see in many EU countries, especially in Hungary and Poland. Partly it is the other way round, developments in the Balkans are spreading into EU countries. Probably the interconnections with Hungary or specifically with prime minister Orban are the strongest. Orban - but not only him - supported the former authoritarian government in North - Macedonia before the new government agreed to a compromise concerning the state’s name with Greece. Orban is a close ally of President Vučić and has - together with his Serb colleague - a very positive attitude towards Russian President Putin. Unfortunately, the EU Commissioner, who was nominated by Orban, Oliver Varhelyi, has been given the portfolio of enlargement and is at least very soft on the undemocratic developments in the Western Balkans.
Many civil society representatives expressed their concern and frustration in respect to the European tolerance of corruptions and state capture. If EU leaders, at least those who are supporting the founding ideas of a united Europe and the Charter of fundamental rights, look at the developments in the Balkans, they must be strongly concerned. As the present enlargement strategy does not deliver the required results, change is necessary. Some may draw the conclusion to give up the idea of enlargement as they fear contamination by the corrupt and undemocratic forces of the region.
In this connection, one has also to mention the irresponsible reaction of some member states, who are vetoing opening accession talks with North Macedonia although the country compromised painfully with Greece and changed its constitutional name. Equally, the EU-Council is blocking the visa-free regime with Kosovo, although this country fulfilled the conditions requested by the EU. De-facto some members already stopped the enlargement process without offering alternatives. Outside authoritarian forces and leaders from Russia and China as well as from Turkey are very happy about this. More and more they see in the Balkans a free and open space to extend their influence. In case of an official end of the enlargement process, they would even be able to step up their activities in what a civil society representative called herself the “underbelly” of Europe. But there should be no doubt, that growing activities of Russia, China and Turkey in the Western Balkans would have strong repercussions for the European Union.
The other alternative to the stalemate of the traditional accession talks, would be to take the opportunity for a new start in the European integration process. The EU could offer all the countries of the Balkans a step-by-step integration into the European Union. It could and should offer even years before full membership, active participation in some elements and proceedings of the European project. This could be the Common market, the Common Foreign and Security Policies etc. Basic decisions could only be taken by full members, but the countries of the Western Balkans could be involved in the process of decision-making and implementation. This engagement would also mean, that they would be more challenged to steer a clear pro-European line. The ambivalence of some of the leaders would have to stop. They would not be requested to stop good relations with outside countries or to end investments from these countries. But they would be asked to introduce more clarity in their foreign policy. And finally, the people of the different countries would know which way their leaders are proposing to go.
What is fundamental is a common fight of all forces who underline and support democracy and human rights, they should join forces. At the end it is not so much an issue between different European states inside and outside the EU. We need a common strategy of forces which take the European idea and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights seriously. The fight against violation of these rights and against state capture must be a common one. The „progressive“ forces must be at least as interlinked as the forces who want to destroy civil liberties, which were gained in a long struggle of emancipation.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.